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Abstract
From preventing the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation to monitoring the transportation of special
nuclear materials, nuclear radiation detection plays an important role in national security applications.
However, changing background radiation, shielding effects, and short collection time make radiation detection
a challenging problem. Anomaly detection, source localization, and isotope identification are three major
parts of radiation detection. The concept of mobile radiation sensor networks, which utilize multiple mobile
radiation detectors, has been proposed to solve these problems. This work mainly focuses on developing
and testing methodologies for anomaly detection and radioactive source localization using mobile sensor
networks. A collection of techniques and analyses for radiation detection are presented and evaluated.
More specifically, in this work, a mobile sensor network simulation system is first developed to simulate
the scenario where multiple radiation detectors move around a city. Based on the simulated data, the
performance characteristics of mobile sensor networks for radiation detection are studied and quantified.
Next, focusing on geospatial modeling of radiation count data, Poisson kriging is proposed to estimate the
background radiation level and perform anomalous source detection. The proposed method is validated
using simulated source data injected in measured background radiation data and results indicate that the
proposed algorithm can detect the anomalous radiation source with 90% accuracy under certain conditions.
Additionally, source localization techniques based on maximum likelihood estimation are explored in detail.
Simulation and experimental results show that source localization error can be reduced to be within 3 meters.
Lastly, an exploratory study of spectrum-based anomaly detection techniques is presented. The performance





First, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my advisor, Professor Rizwan Uddin. This work would
not have been possible without his support and guidance. Also, I want to express my thanks to Professor
Clair Sullivan for her guidance and help during the first three years.
I would like to express my thanks to my committee members, Professor Shiva Abbaszadeh, Professor
Robert Brunner, and Professor Kathryn Huff, for investing time and efforts to help me improve this thesis.
I want to thank my group members and alumni for their instructive discussions and for their kind help
in the past five years.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents and Chunyan Hao for their endless love and support
on my road to knowledge.
iv
Table of Contents
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Nuclear Radiation Detection Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Mobile Sensor Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Current Radiation Detection Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.1 Anomaly Detection and Isotope Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.2 Source Localization and Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Chapter 2 Technical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Background Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Radiation Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Gross Count Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.2 Radiation Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Performance Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Kernel Density Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 Maximum Likelihood Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.7 Optimization Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.7.1 Gradient Ascent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.7.2 Newton-Raphson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.8 Neural Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Chapter 3 Simulation and Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Mobile Sensor Network Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.1 Mobile Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.2 Synthetic Data Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4 Experiment and Source Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
v
Chapter 4 Mobile Sensor Network Systematic Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2 Regional Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3 Influence of Detector Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4 Influence of Number of Detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Chapter 5 Poisson Kriging for Background Radiation Estimation and Anomalous Source
Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.2 Poisson Kriging and Background Radiation Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.2.1 Poisson Kriging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.2.2 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2.3 Background Radiation Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.3 Poisson Kriging for Anomalous Source Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3.1 Anomalous Source Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3.2 Error Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Chapter 6 Parameter Estimation for Anomalous Source Localization . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.2 Background and Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.2.1 Parameter Estimation for Source Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.2.2 Kernel Density Estimation with Maximum Likelihood Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.2.3 Grid Search with Maximum Likelihood Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.2.4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.3 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.3.1 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.3.2 Results for Sources Injected in Measured Background Radiation Data . . . . . . . . . 79
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Chapter 7 Spectrum-Based Anomaly Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
7.2 Dimensionality Reduction and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.2.1 Principal Component Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.2.2 Autoencoder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.3 Regression Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.3.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.3.2 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.3.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.4 Proximity-Based Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.4.1 Distance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.4.2 Distance-Based Anomaly Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
7.4.3 Density-Based Anomaly Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Chapter 8 Summary and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Appendix A Detector Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Appendix B Introduction to GADRAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
vi
Appendix C Synthetic Data Simulation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Appendix D Instructions on How to Use the Synthetic Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
D.1 Synthetic Data Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
D.2 Mobile Sensor Network Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Appendix E Simulation Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Appendix F Experimental Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Appendix G Possion Kriging Error Case Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Appendix H Proof that Profile Log-Likelihood Function is Concave . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Appendix I Maximum Likelihood Estimation Optimization Techniques . . . . . . . . . . 120
I.1 Gradient Ascent Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
I.2 Newton-Raphson Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Appendix J Preliminary Analysis for Mobile Radioactive Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Appendix K Connection between Grid Search with Maximum Likelihood Estimation
and Bayesian Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Appendix L Sample Code for Autoencoder Implemented in TensorFlow . . . . . . . . . 127
Appendix M K-Nearest Neighbors Query Time Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Appendix N Application of Anomaly Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
vii
List of Figures
1.1 Schematic diagram of typical radiation detection system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Block diagram flowchart of thesis outline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 Distribution of background radiation on the engineering campus of the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. The data were collected using multiple D3S detectors. Three relatively
high background regions, namely the Nuclear Radiation Laboratory (A), the Alma Mater
statue (B), and a church (C), are marked using dashed rectangles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Illustration of the change of background radiation under different weather conditions. The
data were collected using D3S detectors in outdoor environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Radiation spectra for background radiation, and 137Cs, 60Co, and 152Eu. . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Sample ROC curves. Method 1 and method 2 represent two sample methods in general. . . . 17
2.5 Illustration of kernel density estimation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 Illustration of neural network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.7 Illustration of neural network single node operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1 D3S detector and cell phone as single mobile sensor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Schematic diagram of radioactive source spectrum simulation process. The spectra are simu-
lated at different distances from the radioactive source. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Illustration of synthetic data superposition process. The background and radioactive source
spectra are simulated using GADRAS for D3S detector and NaI detector. The 1 µCi 137Cs
source is placed 1 meter away from the detector. All spectra are simulated for 1 hour. . . . . 27
3.4 Illustration of simulated city map. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.5 Illustration of simulated background radiation. Radiation data are simulated using GADRAS
for D3S detectors. Higher background radiation region is located in the lower left part. . . . . 30
3.6 Illustration of experimental area, background radiation measurements, radioactive source lo-
cations, and source injection process. Three relatively high background regions are denoted
using dashed rectangles A, B, and C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.7 Illustration of synthetic source injection process. After source injection, the radiation level
around the injected sources is increased. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.1 Relationship of Poisson anomaly score and k-sigma anomaly score. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2 Comparison of global and regional anomaly detection methods. 13 radioactive sources are
placed at the intersections of roads, denoted by yellow color. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.3 ROC curves of global and regional anomaly detection methods (regional method uses the data
from surrounding 30 m radius to estimate the background radiation). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4 Comparing the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of Ortec 905-3 detector and D3S detector. The
error bar is shown with one standard error. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5 Average reachable time versus number of detectors. Error bar is shown with one standard
error. The simulated map is shown in Fig. 3.4, which has the area of 650 m × 530 m. . . . . 41
4.6 Area under the ROC curve with different number of detectors. The error bar is shown with
one standard error (Due to the randomness in simulation, there are some fluctuations with
the error bars). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
viii
5.1 Background radiation measurements. Data were collected using D3S detectors in the outdoor
environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.2 Semi-variogram plot of background radiation measurements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.3 Poisson kriging estimation of background radiation distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.4 Distribution of standard deviation for Poisson kriging estimation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.5 Radiation measurements with synthetic source injection. The injected source is denoted by
the red cross inside the circle (the exact location is: x=55.87 m, y=196.93 m). . . . . . . . . . 54
5.6 Poisson anomaly score distribution calculated using Poisson kriging model for background
radiation. The injected source is denoted by the red cross inside the circle. . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.7 ROC curve for point data based method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.8 Poisson kriging estimation with synthetic source injection. The injected source is denoted by
the red cross inside the circle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.9 Anomalous source detection flowchart. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.10 SNR-based anomaly score from the Poisson kriging model. Location of the injected source is
denoted by the red cross inside a circle and the estimated source location is denoted by the
black triangle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.11 A case where the Poisson kriging model cannot detect correct radioactive source location.
The injected source is denoted by a red cross and the estimated source location is denoted by
a black triangle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.12 Anomaly score without radioactive sources. The estimated source location is denoted by the
black triangle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.13 Anomaly score with source injected at high background region. The injected source is denoted
by the red cross and the estimated source location is denoted by the black triangle. . . . . . . 62
5.14 Poisson kriging anomaly detection for selected experiments. Actual radioactive source loca-
tions are denoted by red crosses and estimated source locations are denoted by black triangles. 65
6.1 Illustration of KDE with MLE for source localization and strength estimation. . . . . . . . . 70
6.2 Illustration of grid search with MLE for source localization and strength estimation. . . . . . 71
6.3 Flowchart of KDE with MLE and Grid Search with MLE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.4 Illustration of simulated city map. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.5 Results of KDE approach with bandwidth 5 m when the source is placed at the intersection of
the roads (scenario with source number 2 in Fig. 6.4). The actual source location is denoted
by the red triangle while the peak location of probability density is denoted by the dark cross. 74
6.6 Change of estimated source location error with different Gaussian kernel bandwidths (σ in






). Results are averaged for 4 typical scenarios depicted in Fig. 6.4. 75
6.7 Results of the grid search with MLE when source is placed at the intersection of roads (scenario
with source number 2 in Fig. 6.4). The background color corresponds to the normalized
likelihood value (scaled to be between 0 and 1). The actual source location is denoted by red
triangle while the peak location of normalized likelihood value is denoted by dark cross. . . . 77
6.8 Change of estimated source location error as a function of steps for KDE with MLE approach
and grid search with MLE approach. Results are averaged for 4 source scenarios depicted in
Fig. 6.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.9 Change of source strength estimation error with KDE approach and grid search approach.
Results are averaged for 4 typical scenarios depicted in Fig. 6.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.1 Sample spectra with 1024 channels for Ortec 905 NaI detector. The corresponding energies
are shown in parentheses. White dots indicate non-zero counts at corresponding channels and
black dots indicate zero count. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
7.2 Illustration of PCA on 2D sample data. Sample abnormal measurement A is denoted by red
dot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.3 Cumulative variance explained by various number of principal components. . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.4 Structure of a 5-layer Autoencoder system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
ix
7.5 Spectrum reconstruction examples using PCA and autoencoder. Spectra were collected using
2 × 2 inches NaI detector in laboratory for 30 s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.6 ROC curves for PCA and autoencoder systems for anomaly detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.7 Illustration of Anomaly Detection. Sample abnormal measurements are denoted by characters
A, B, and C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.8 Comparison of KNN with L1 and L2 distances for different number of nearest neighbors. . . . 97
7.9 Illustration of Anomaly Detection. Two sample abnormal measurements are denoted by letters
A and B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A.1 Dimensions of NaI 905-3 detector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
B.1 Snapshot of GADRAS software. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
C.1 Schematic diagram of radioactive source spectrum simulation process. The spectra are simu-
lated at different distances from the radioactive source. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
D.1 Snapshot of simulated radiation data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
E.1 Illustration of simulated radioactive source locations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
F.1 Illustration of experimental area, background radiation measurements, radioactive source lo-
cations, and source injection process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
F.2 Snapshot of collected experimental data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
G.1 A case where source injection is conducted on the data collected in the morning. The injected
source is denoted by the red cross and the estimated source location is denoted by the black
triangle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
J.1 Box plot for source localization errors with 500 µCi source. Time window varying from 1
second to 10 seconds is denoted using different colors. Number of detectors are varied from
40 to 160. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
J.2 Box plot for source localization errors with 60 detectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
M.1 Comparison of query time for KNN with different number of neighbors. . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
M.2 Comparison of query time for KNN with different sample size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
N.1 Visualization of sample 60Co, 137Cs, and 54Mn spectra PCA projection. Data are simulated
using GADRAS as described in Chapter 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
N.2 Visualization of sample 60Co, 137Cs, and 54Mn spectra PCA projection after dimensionality
reduction and reconstruction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
x
List of Tables
2.1 Linear Attenuation Coefficient at Gamma-ray Energies of 100, 200, and 500 keV . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Common Radioactive Isotopes and Major Gamma-ray Energies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1 Simulated Source (137Cs) Intensity in Counts Per Second for D3S Detector and Ortec 905
Detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 Relative Locations of Injected Radioactive Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1 Source Intensity and SNR at Different Distances without Shielding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.1 Top 7 Potential Radioactive Source Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.2 Source (137Cs) Detection Accuracy with 5 m Distance Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.3 Source (137Cs) Detection Accuracy with 10 m Distance Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.4 Source (137Cs) Detection Accuracy with 20 m Distance Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.1 Average Source (137Cs) Localization Error for KDE Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.2 Average Source (137Cs) Localization Error for Grid Search Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.1 AUC for Different Autoencoder Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.2 Comparison of Anomaly Detection for Linear Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.3 Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) of Different Anomaly Detection Techniques . . . . . . . . 99
A.1 Characteristics of D3S Detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
G.1 Statistical Distribution of Radiation Data from Morning and Afternoon . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
xi
List of Abbreviations
ALSO Attribute-wise Learning for Scoring Outliers
AUC Area Under the ROC Curve or Area Under the Curve
CNN Convolutional Neural Network
D3S Discreet Dual Detector
DSN Distributed Sensor Networks
FPR False Positive Rate
GADRAS Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ITDB Incident and Trafficking Database
ITP Iterative Pruning
KDE Kernel Density Estimation
KNN K-nearest Neighbor
LOF Local Outlier Factor
MAE Mean Absolute Error
MCMC Markov Chain Monte Carlo
MLE Maximum Likelihood Estimation
MoE Mean of Estimators
MoM Mean of Measurements
MSE Mean Squared Error
NORM Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material
PCA Principal Component Analysis
ReLU Rectified Linear Unit
RNN Recurrent Neural Network
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic
SNIP Statistics-sensitive Non-linear Iterative Peak-clipping
xii
SNM Special Nuclear Material
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio
SPRT Sequential Probability Ratio Test
SVD Singular Value Decomposition
SVM Support Vector Machine




1.1 Nuclear Radiation Detection Problems
Nuclear weapons, radiological dispersal devices, as well as lost radioactive sources are threats to national
security and human health. According to the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)1, from 1993
to 2017, there were 3,235 confirmed incidents reported in total, including incidents related to trafficking or
malicious use. There is a need to develop nuclear radiation detection and monitoring systems and algorithms
that can prevent potential dangers. Currently, large radiation detection systems have been deployed at key
choke points such as airports and customs to prevent the unauthorized entry or exit of radioactive materials.
However, these systems at the borders cannot help to monitor materials already in the country, such as
radioactive sources for medical, industrial, or research purposes. To enable nuclear radiation detection and
monitoring over large areas, such as big cities, a distributed radiation detection system is needed.
Different from other signal capturing processes, there are some unique challenges in nuclear radiation
detection. One of the key challenges is background radiation. Background radiation comes from the envi-
ronment and it exists almost everywhere. It is influenced by many factors, such as weather conditions and
surrounding buildings. Background radiation can be seen as the noise, which keeps changing temporally
and spatially. The signal that radiation monitoring agencies are mostly interested in comes from special
radioactive materials such as 235U and Pu. Due to the inverse square law of radiation propagation [1], the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) decreases dramatically as the distance from radiation detectors to radioactive
sources increases, which makes it hard to collect useful signals at a large distance. Another challenge is
the shielding effect. Different materials, such as buildings and automobiles, can reduce the signal strength
accordingly and make it even harder to detect. In addition, limited data collection time can be a challenge.
Radioactive materials may be carried by moving vehicles or people. This requires the data collection time
to be as short as few to several seconds. All these factors make radiation detection and monitoring a very
challenging problem.
1International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) 2018 Fact Sheet: https://www.
iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/12/itdb-factsheet-2018.pdf.
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A typical radiation detection system can be divided into several parts. A schematic diagram is shown
in Fig. 1.1. Radiation signals that might contain information from radioactive sources are first collected
by radiation detectors, which is denoted by “data collection” process. Once collected, the data will be
analyzed by various algorithms and techniques. The process of radiation detection can be divided into
three distinct parts: anomaly detection, source localization, and isotope identification. The goal of anomaly
detection is to distinguish the signals that contain radioactive source information from the set of measured
radiation signals. After anomaly detection, abnormal measurements are separated and the data that need
to be further processed will be dramatically decreased in volume since most data contain only background
radiation information. Also, smaller regions that may contain radioactive sources are identified. The goal
of source localization is to accurately locate the radioactive sources based on the information from anomaly
detection. The last one, isotope identification, is to identify the isotopic composition of the radioactive
source. For nuclear radiation, data collection is carried out by radiation detectors. High quality data can
help simplify subsequent steps. However, this work is not aimed at high quality radiation detector design
or analysis. Instead, this thesis focuses on the analysis of radiation signals coming from large number of
low-quality detectors. More specifically, the anomaly detection and source localization steps are analyzed in





Figure 1.1: Schematic diagram of typical radiation detection system.
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1.2 Mobile Sensor Networks
To enable nuclear radiation detection over large areas, a single or even several radiation detectors are
insufficient. The concept of distributed sensor networks (DSNs) [2] that utilize multiple stationary detectors
has been put forward and well studied. Distributed sensor networks have some advantages over single
detector systems. Nemzed et al. [3] noticed that when combining the data from a small number of detectors,
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) increased as
√
N , where N is the number of detectors used. Brennan et al.
have shown, through validated simulation, that distributed detector systems improved the performance over
a single detector [2], even when the detectors’ sensitivity or energy resolution were not as good as the single
detector [4]. Through mathematical analysis and simulations, Chandy et al. found that the networks of
static sensors can reduce the rate of false positives and help direct people to rapidly locate the radioactive
sources [5].
However, due to the inverse square law of radiation propagation, SNR decreases dramatically as the
distance from radiation detectors to the actual source increases. This requires the distributed sensor network
system to have a high density of sensors to ensure high detectability of radioactive sources. In other words,
with the same number of detectors, to ensure sufficient detectability, the area that can be covered by the
distributed sensor network is restricted, which will increase the cost when the area to be monitored is
large. To solve these problems, there has been research focused on using mobile sensor networks to detect
radioactive sources [6–9].
Mobile detectors are easily deployable. Small mobile detectors can be carried by people and larger
detectors can be carried by vehicles such as police cars. In addition, with the same number of detectors,
due to the mobility, a mobile sensor network system can cover a larger area. Study has shown that mobile
sensor networks are more effective in reducing the time to locate the radioactive sources than stationary
sensor networks [6].
Mobility also leads to some challenges. Traditional techniques usually combine the information from
surrounding detectors or use the historical information from fixed positions [10, 11] to make more robust
estimations. However, with mobile sensor networks, the position of each detector changes over time and
the historical data from fixed positions or the information from surrounding detectors may not be available.
These factors require new algorithms for mobile sensor networks, which is the major focus of this work.
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1.3 Current Radiation Detection Methods
Traditionally, there are two kinds of radiation detection: active and passive [12]. In active detection,
externally generated bremsstrahlung X-rays [13] or neutrons [14] are needed to investigate the suspicious
materials. Special nuclear materials (SNM) can be identified upon analyzing the spectra [13, 14]. Active
detection is generally used at airports and customs, but it is expensive and lacks mobility, which make it
unsuitable for large-scale nuclear radiation detection. On the other hand, passive detection does not need
neutrons or photons to probe, and it measures the emitted radiation directly. Passive mode is widely used
in radiation detection. The existing algorithms, which either analyze the gross count rate or the spectra, are
mainly based on passive detection. This thesis only explores passive detection.
Existing radiation detection methods mainly focus on three aspects: anomaly detection, isotope identi-
fication, and source localization. Source strength estimation usually accompanies source localization. For
anomaly detection, the key is to accurately estimate the background radiation. Then anomaly detection
can be performed based on the estimated background radiation. Isotope identification needs radiation spec-
tral information. For source localization and estimation, the key is to build an accurate physical model to
represent the radiation transport processes. This section gives a brief review of the existing methods for
background radiation estimation, anomaly detection, isotope identification, and source localization.
1.3.1 Anomaly Detection and Isotope Identification
The event that people are interested in, namely if radioactive sources actually exist somewhere, has
very low probability to happen. Accordingly, most of the collected data contain only background radiation
information. After collecting the data, the first step is to process the data such that only the data consisting
of radioactive source information are kept. The highly imbalanced data, in which most measurements are
from normal background radiation and only a small portion contains information from radioactive sources,
distinguish the radiation detection problem from traditional binary classification problems [15]. Instead,
radiation detection is essentially an anomaly detection or outlier analysis problem [16]. Hawkins [17] defined
the outlier as “an observation which deviates so much from other observations as to arouse suspicious that it
was generated by a different mechanism”. In nuclear radiation detection field, the data that contain signals
from various radioactive sources are naturally defined as abnormal measurements since they originate from
processes that are different from those that lead to normal background radiation. The goal of anomaly
detection in radiation data is to identify all data that contain information from radioactive sources with a
low probability of false positives.
The key to identifying outliers is to distinguish the measurements consisting of information from radioac-
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tive sources from those with only background radiation. As will be discussed later, background radiation
exists everywhere and it changes with time. The real-world radiation data collected by detectors are noisy.
When radioactive source intensity is low or the distance to radioactive sources is large or the radioactive
source is well-shielded, the SNR is low, which makes the signals from the actual sources hard to distinguish
from the background radiation signals. All these factors make it hard to accurately distinguish between data
from radioactive sources and background radiation.
Depending on the data quality, different methods have been developed to identify data from radioactive
sources. When detector size is small or data collection time is short (e.g., 1 second), the spectral quality
is low. In this case, gross count rate is the only information that can be used to identify anomalies. In
the most widely used method, the k-sigma method, some predefined threshold is used to determine whether
or not there are radioactive sources. If the count rate of the given data is above the threshold, then it is
assumed that some sources have been detected [6, 11]. Although very simple, the k-sigma method works
well when the threshold is properly defined and background radiation is correctly measured or estimated.
In addition to the k-sigma method, Bayesian estimation and the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT)
have also been applied to detect the anomalies. Bayesian algorithms compute the posterior probability
distribution based on estimated prior distribution [18]. The performance of these algorithms has been
tested using simulations [1, 3, 5, 19]. SPRT is a widely used hypothesis-testing method. It compares current
measurements to a previous baseline [11]. SPRT is useful for long-term radiation monitoring [20] and for
low-level point source detection and localization with stationary detectors [21,22].
For cases with only gross count rate data, background radiation is either assumed to be known or can be
estimated using the data from surrounding detectors or from historical data. For more modern detectors,
however, the collected data may also contain the spectral information, which make it possible to estimate the
background radiation purely from single measurement. Several methods have been developed to estimate
and separate the background radiation. Kirkpatrick et al. used Poisson rather than Gaussian statistics to
compute the background contributions to gamma-ray spectra, which proved to be a sensitive method in the
case of small signals in low-count spectra [23]. By making the assumption that the background signal varied
smoothly while the signal from radioactive sources varied more rapidly, Fischer et al. proposed the Bayesian
method to estimate the background radiation spectra [24]. Morháč et al. proposed a statistics-sensitive non-
linear iterative peak-clipping (SNIP) method to determine the peak regions and then eliminated background
radiation in the gamma-ray spectra [25, 26]. An efficient iterative filtering method was proposed by Zhu et
al. to estimate the background radiation spectra in noisy spectra [27]. Based on the assumption that the
local minimum belonged to the background radiation, Alamaniotis et al. proposed a kernel-based machine
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learning method to estimate the background radiation for low-count gamma-ray spectra with unknown
sources without any prior information [28]. The estimated background spectra from this method had the right
shape, but the amplitude of the estimated background spectra was either too high or too low. An algorithm
that coupled a robust Kalman filter and an Expectation-Maximization framework was designed by Fraschini
and Chaillan to recursively estimate the background spectra [29]. A series of supervised classifiers were also
trained through different algorithms, such as support vector machine (SVM) and random forests [11]. The
trained classifiers were used to classify new spectra into threat or non-threat categories. These methods
need a large quantity of pre-labelled data to train the classifier. They work well for the cases in which only
particular sources are included and the testing data are similar to the training data. However, when there
are unknown sources in the testing data or the background radiation is changing, correctly labelling the
training data is almost impossible, which makes it hard to train a model that generalizes well for unseen
spectra. In addition, other methods, such as spectral peak erosion [30], digital filters, and Monte Carlo
simulations [31] have also been used in the literature to estimate background radiation.
Spectra are not only useful for anomaly detection, but also important for isotope identification. Spectrum
fitting is traditionally used to detect the existence of particular radioactive sources. For the spectrum fitting
method, the measured spectrum is fitted with various templates from the pre-calculated library [11]. Spec-
trum fitting methods can work well when spectra are well-collected, but when data collection time is short
(e.g., 1 or 2 seconds) and detector size is small, the collected spectra have low quality and the performance
of spectrum fitting methods will be affected. In addition, principal component analysis (PCA) [32, 33] was
implemented to extract the information about certain isotopes. In current research, PCA was performed on
well-collected data. Its performance on low quality spectra has not been tested. Recently, artificial neural
networks have also been applied for isotope identification, especially fully-connected neural networks and
convolutional neural networks [34,35].
Among the proposed methods, a few need to manually establish prior information, some methods require
long computation time, and other methods focus on high-resolution spectra [28]. For mobile sensor networks,
the detectors usually have small size and the data will be continuously collected only for one to two seconds
for each location. This means that the spectra have low-count and low-resolution. Dynamic methods are
needed to estimate the background radiation for low-count and low-resolution spectra of unknown sources.
1.3.2 Source Localization and Estimation
Different from anomaly detection, the goals of source localization and estimation are, respectively, to
accurately locate the radioactive sources and possibly estimate the strength of radioactive sources. Source
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localization and estimation are usually performed based on measured data suggesting the presence of ra-
dioactive sources in some parts of the region under surveillance.
To pinpoint the radioactive sources and estimate their strength, gross count rate information is generally
used. Chin et al. [21] proposed a two-step approach for the low-level point source identification problem.
This approach combined an iterative pruning (ITP) algorithm [36] and a sequential probability ratio test
(SPRT) for the N-sensor case. Morelande et al. [37] analyzed the estimation problem for multiple radioactive
sources using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Liu et al. proposed a background radiation estimation
algorithm based on MLE to model the spatial and temporal distribution of background radiation and identify
radioactive sources [38, 39]. Zhao and Sullivan analyzed the performance of MLE with grid search on
source localization using simulations and experiments [40]. Upasana and Baum extended the work into
the three-dimensional case using a two-stage adaptive algorithm based on MLE [41]. Different Bayesian
methods have been studied under various circumstances [9, 42–44]. Ram and Verravalli [45] considered the
network of spatially distributed sensors and proposed a recursive algorithm to locate and track the diffusing
point sources. Hochaum et al. [46, 47] proposed an efficient network flow algorithm to detect the nuclear
threats using mobile distributed sensor networks which enabled real-time usage. Simulations were carried
out to prove the proposed algorithm’s effectiveness. Tandon [8] and Tandon et al. [9] proposed a Bayesian
aggregation method to locate the radioactive sources through mobile sensor networks. Their method was
based on spectral analysis. Its effectiveness was demonstrated using experimental and simulation results. In
addition, other methods, such as mean of estimators (MoE) and mean of measurements (MoM) [48], Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling [49], and least squares estimation [50] were also implemented for
source localization problems.
The above methods are mainly focused on passive search, where radiation detectors are either stationary
or randomly moving. Another type of source localization is through active search, in which case radiation
detectors will be guided towards the radioactive sources. Ristic et al. [51–53] proposed an information gain
driven search technique which combined particle filter and Fisher information gain for locating a radioactive
point source. Lin and Tzeng adopted artificial potential field with particle filters to navigate mobile radiation
detectors to find radioactive sources in an unknown environment [54]. Ardiny et al. [55] proposed an au-
tonomous exploration strategy based on multi-criteria decision making for radioactive hotspot localization,
and the proposed technique was tested using simulation. Recently, a search technique based on reinforce-
ment learning was proposed for radioactive source detection, and the simulation study demonstrated the
improvement over the gradient search algorithm [56].
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1.4 Overview
There are eight chapters in this thesis, and the structure of the thesis is shown in Fig. 1.2. Chapter 1
outlines the radiation detection problems and describes mobile sensor networks and related work for anomaly
detection and source localization. Chapter 2 describes the technical details behind radiation detection
and measurements, including nuclear radiation, radiation signal measurement, metrics used to evaluate the
radiation detection systems, neural networks, and generally used estimation and optimization techniques.
Chapter 3 describes the mobile sensor network platform and software used in this work, as well as the
simulation and experiment conducted. Based on the simulations described in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 focuses
on the systematic assessment of mobile sensor networks for radiation detection. The influence of several
key characteristics are studied. In Chapter 5, Poisson kriging is applied to nuclear radiation estimation and
anomalous source detection problems. In Chapter 6, a source localization algorithm based on maximum
likelihood estimation is proposed. Simulation and experimental results show that the proposed method
can reduce source localization error to be within 3 meters. Chapter 7 presents the exploratory analysis on
spectrum-based anomaly detection. A series of machine learning techniques are studied for spectrum-based
anomaly detection. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the work that has been done in this thesis and gives an
overview of future work.
Overall, this thesis systematically evaluates the mobile sensor networks for radiation detection, including
system assessment, background radiation estimation, anomaly detection, and source localization. There are
several innovations in this work. Through incorporating the geospatial correlation, this work implements
Poisson kriging for nuclear radiation estimation, and then extends it for anomalous source detection problems.
Further, based on maximum likelihood estimation, this work proposes approaches based on kernel density
estimation and grid search to iteratively estimate radioactive source location and strength. Also, this work
not only conducts simulations, but also collects experimental data to test the performance of the proposed
approaches. Through these near-real data, this work provides more reliable quantifications and analyses.
However, there are also some limitations. This work does not consider the radiation spatial variation due
to small detector size and short data collection time. There are certain simplifications for simulation and
experiments, and the complex shielding effect has not been explicitly considered and studied. Also, this
work assumes the radioactive sources are stationary and the scenarios with mobile radioactive sources have



































A typical nuclear radiation detection system consists of many different aspects. Nuclear radiation, es-
pecially radiation from the naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM), exists almost everywhere.
Spectrum and count rate are generally used to quantify the signal strength and radiation characteristics, in
which different kinds of radiation detectors play important roles. This chapter briefly describes the technical
background behind radiation detection, including background radiation, radiation measurements, metrics
used to evaluate the performance of radiation detection system, and some general introduction to math-
ematical methods used in this thesis such as kernel density estimation, maximum likelihood estimation,
optimization techniques, and neural networks.
2.2 Background Radiation
Background radiation generally refers to naturally existing radiation. All humans are continuously ex-
posed to such radiation. Natural radiation sources [57,58] include:
1. Cosmic rays that come from outer space and from the Sun.
2. Terrestrial radionuclides that occur within the Earth’s crust, in building materials, air, water,
foods, and in the human body itself. They mainly come from 40K and the daughter products of the
decay series of 235U , 238U , 226Ra, 222Rn, and 232Th [11, 59].
Background radiation varies spatially and temporally. It is influenced by weather conditions, surrounding
environment and so on. Studies have shown that the background radiation level increases during precipita-
tion [60, 61]. Soil conditions were also found to affect the background radiation level [62]. Figure 2.1 shows
the distribution of background radiation levels at the engineering campus of the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. The data were collected using multiple D3S detectors1. The color corresponds to the
1Discreet Dual Detector. See Appendix A for technical details of D3S detectors.
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background radiation level, where lighter color represents higher background radiation level. The spatial
fluctuation of background radiation is clear and some locations have as much as two to three times higher
background radiation level than other locations. The background radiation near buildings is usually higher
than other places, such as the lawn and parking lot. Three typical high background regions are marked







Figure 2.1: Distribution of background radiation on the engineering campus of the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. The data were collected using multiple D3S detectors. Three relatively high background
regions, namely the Nuclear Radiation Laboratory (A), the Alma Mater statue (B), and a church (C), are
marked using dashed rectangles.
In addition to spatial variation, different weather conditions lead to temporal variation as well. Figure 2.2
shows the influence of rain on the distribution of background radiation. All data were collected in the outdoor
environment using D3S detectors. During precipitation, the background radiation level is higher, which is
generally assumed due to the 222Rn progeny accretion during precipitation.
2For Alma Master status and the church, the high background radiation is due to the materials they contain. For example,
the base of the statue and the stairs of the church are both made of granite, which cause the high background radiation.
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(a) Histogram of background radiation count rate.



















(b) Boxplot of background radiation count rate.
Figure 2.2: Illustration of the change of background radiation under different weather conditions. The data
were collected using D3S detectors in outdoor environment.
When the source strength is not strong, the existence of background radiation makes it hard to accu-
rately identify the radiation from radioactive sources, such as the radiation from 137Cs, 60Co, and 54Mn.
Accurately estimating the background radiation is the key to addressing many problems in nuclear radiation
detection.
2.3 Radiation Measurement
Nuclear radiation needs to be correctly measured to quantify background radiation and identify radioac-
tive sources. There are different types of radiation, such as α particle, β particles, and gamma-ray. This
work only considers gamma-ray for nuclear detection. Gamma rays can be measured by various radiation
detectors through the interaction of radiation within the detector. Some detectors can only record the gross
counts received by the detector, such as a Geiger-Mueller counter. Other detectors can also record the raw
spectra, which enables more detailed analyses and application of additional techniques for radiation detec-
tion and source identification. Depending on the detectors and the purpose, gross count rate and spectrum
are used for different problems.
2.3.1 Gross Count Rate
Gross count measures the radiation counts in some time interval. The raw data collected by radiation
detectors are always integers. The count rate is simply the counts in a unit time. In this work, since all
radiation data are measured every second, the count rate is also an integer. For radiation detection, the
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measured count rate by a detector is generally assumed to follow a Poisson distribution. The probability, p,
that a detector collects m counts in a unit time with expectation λ is:




In Eq. 2.1, λ represents the expected count rate, which stands for the radiation level at certain location.
λ consists of the contribution from surrounding background and radioactive sources, in the form of λ ≡ b+s,
where b refers to the radiation from background and s refers to the radiation from radioactive sources. s
would be zero when there are no radioactive sources. b is influenced by many factors, such as the surrounding
buildings, weather condition and so on. Typically, b is a function of location r and time t. Over a short time
interval, b can be assumed to be constant for a given position. s, on the other hand, is mainly influenced by
radioactive sources, distance from radioactive sources, and shielding materials between radioactive source
and radiation detectors.
Suppose that some radioactive source with source intensity3 s0 is placed at location r0, where r0 =
(x0, y0) ∈ R2, and the i-th detector is placed at position ri = (xi, yi). The distance4 of the i-th detector
to the source is di = ||ri − r0|| =
√
(xi − x0)2 + (yi − y0)2. Then the average count rate λi measured at
distance di is:



















results from the attenuation effect. Table 2.1 lists several common materials and
their density as well as the linear attenuation coefficient at different energy levels.
3To simplify the mathematical expressions, in this work, source intensity s0 is defined to be the average count rate measured
by a given type of detector that is placed 1 m away from the source without any shielding.
4Here, for the distance calculation, only x and y directions are considered. The height of the detector is ignored since it is
always assumed to be 1 meter high above the ground.
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Table 2.1: Linear Attenuation Coefficient at Gamma-ray Energies of 100, 200, and 500 keV
Absorber Density (g/cm3)
Linear Attenuation Coefficient (cm−1)
100 keV 200 keV 500 keV
Air 0.001225 0.000195 0.000159 0.000112
Water 1.00 0.167 0.136 0.097
Carbon 2.00 0.335 0.274 0.196
Aluminium 2.70 0.435 0.324 0.227
Iron 7.87 2.720 1.090 0.655
Copper 8.93 3.800 1.309 0.730
Lead 11.34 59.700 10.150 1.640
Source: en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Basic_Physics_of_Nuclear_Medicine/Attenuation_of_Gamma-Rays.
2.3.2 Radiation Spectrum
Gross count rate has been widely used for nuclear radiation detection. As will be shown later, it is still a
very important quantity for anomaly detection and source localization problems. However, as a scalar value,
gross count rate cannot be used to distinguish different radioactive sources. For problems such as isotope
identification, a gamma-ray spectrum is needed.
A spectrum is the histogram of gamma-ray counts binned by energies. Different detectors have different
energy ranges, but typically, the spectrum contains the records in the energy range of 30 keV to 3 MeV. The
number of channels varies according to the detectors. For example, the D3S detector has 512 channels while
the Ortec 905 NaI detector has 1,024 channels5. A typical background radiation spectrum and the spectra
for 137Cs, 60Co, and 152Eu are shown in Fig. 2.3. All spectra are measured using the Ortec 905 NaI detector
in room 209D of Talbot Laboratory by the author for 10 seconds. The orange color corresponds to the
average background radiation spectrum. Figure 2.3a shows spectra from background radiation. Figure 2.3b,
Fig. 2.3c, and Fig. 2.3d show spectra from 137Cs, 60Co, and 152Eu, respectively. The typical gamma-ray
energies are listed in Table 2.2 for some frequently used radioactive isotopes.
5See Appendix A for technical details of the D3S detector and the Ortec 905 NaI detector.
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(a) Typical background radiation spectrum.













137Cs  Source Spectrum
Average Background
(b) Typical 137Cs spectrum with background.














60Co  Source Spectrum
Average Background
(c) Typical 60Co spectrum with background.










152Eu  Source Spectrum
Average Background
(d) Typical 152Eu spectrum with background.
Figure 2.3: Radiation spectra for background radiation, and 137Cs, 60Co, and 152Eu.
Table 2.2: Common Radioactive Isotopes and Major Gamma-ray Energies
Radioactive Isotope Typical Gamma-ray Energy (keV)
241Am 59.5









As discussed in Chapter 1, the focus of this work is on anomaly detection and source localization prob-
lems. For source localization, the Euclidean distance of the estimated source location from the actual source
location is generally used to quantify and compare the performance of source localization algorithms. How-
ever, for anomaly detection, traditional metrics used for binary classification problems, such as classification
accuracy or error rate, are not appropriate since the proportion of abnormal measurements, indicating the
presence of a source, is usually very low. In this work, a receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC
curve) and the area under the curve (AUC) [63] are chosen to compare the performance of different anomaly
detection techniques.
The ROC curve is the plot of true positive rate versus false positive rate at different thresholds [64]. The
definitions of true positive events and false positive events vary among problems. For radiation detection,
the true condition has two cases: either there is a radioactive source, or there is no radioactive source.
The predictions from the radiation detection system have two results: alert or no-alert. So, there are four
outcomes based on the true situation and the predicted results: alert when sources are present, no-alert
when sources are present, alert when sources are not present, and no-alert when sources are not present.
The corresponding events are defined as: true positive events (TP), false negative events (FN), false positive
events (FP), and true negative events (TN), respectively. Based on these definitions, true positive rate















A ROC curve shows the change in TPR with increasing FPR. For an ideal system, the true positive






























(b) Sample ROC curves in natural log scale.
Figure 2.4: Sample ROC curves. Method 1 and method 2 represent two sample methods in general.
As shown in Fig. 2.4a, ROC curves for two sample methods are plotted along with the chance curve,
which represents the performance of random guess. The area under the curve (AUC) indicates the overall
performance of different methods. AUC is calculated as the area under the ROC curve with the maximum
value of 1. Higher AUC is usually preferred. For example, the AUC of chance curve is 0.5, and the AUC of
method 1 is higher than AUC of method 2, in which case method 1 is preferred over method 2.
For radiation detection, since the incidents have very low probability, any radiation detection system
should have a low false positive rate to avoid massive wasting of resources. Thus, in addition to overall
performance, the likelihood of the system at a given false positive rate is also of concern. But the original
ROC curves shown in Fig. 2.4a cannot clearly show the important information when the false positive rate is
low. In this case, the ROC curves plotted with the false positive rate in natural log scale is a better choice.
The results are shown in Fig. 2.4b, which clearly shows the difference between method 1 and method 2 when
the false positive rate is low.
In addition to the ROC curve and the AUC, there are other metrics that can be used, such as precision,
recall, and F1 score. Precision is defined as the fraction of true positive events (TP) over true positive events
(TP) plus false positive events (FP). Recall has the same definition as true positive rate. Similar to the
trade-off between true positive rate and false positive rate, there exists the trade-off between precision and
recall, which is usually plotted as the precision-recall curve6.
6See Ref [16] or https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precision_and_recall for more details.
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2.5 Kernel Density Estimation
Kernel density estimation (KDE) [15, 65] is a nonparametric approach to approximate the probability
density function given observed data. For KDE, there is no need to make any assumption about data’s
distribution. The only need is to choose a smooth non-negative kernel function, and then KDE can give an
estimation of the original distribution from which observed data are drawn.
Considering a random 1D sample dataset with N measurements, x1, x2, · · · , xN . Assuming that these
samples are drawn from a probability density function f(x), the goal of KDE is to obtain an estimated








where C is the normalizing constant to make f̂(x) a valid probability density function.
To better illustrate the mechanism behind KDE, a sample case is shown in Fig. 2.5. There are 20
randomly sampled data x1, x2, · · · , x20 from a sample Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard
deviation 1, which are denoted by short blue vertical lines on the figure. For KDE, a Gaussian kernel,
K(x, xi) = exp(− (x−xi)
2
2h2 ) where h is the bandwidth, is selected. For each xi, there is a fitted kernel plotted
over the x-axis, which is denoted by the red curves. The estimated probability density, which is the total
sum of all kernels, is shown using the green curve. Through KDE, a smooth estimation of probability density
is obtained, which can help better understand the distribution of original data.
Figure 2.5: Illustration of kernel density estimation.
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2.6 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is a method used for parameter estimation given observed data.
It has been widely used in history [66]. The idea behind MLE is that after formulating the likelihood function
using the observed data, the parameters that maximize the likelihood function can be obtained, which are
the solution to MLE.
Mathematically, assume that the observed data are denoted by x (e.g., x1, x2, · · · , xN ). These data are
assumed to be drawn from some probability distribution f(x; θ) with unknown parameter θ. Then, the





Usually, likelihood function L(θ;x) is hard to maximize directly. Instead, the log-likelihood function





Then, the solution of MLE is:




The maximum likelihood estimation solution in Eq. 2.8 is not always easy to obtain. The log-likelihood
function `(θ;x) might not be concave and there could exist multiple local maxima, or the analytical solution
could be hard to obtain. For the case in which the log-likelihood function `(θ;x) is concave [67] but the ana-
lytical solution is hard to obtain, optimization techniques such as gradient ascent [15], Newton-Raphson [68],
and Fisher’s Scoring [69] can be utilized.
2.7.1 Gradient Ascent
Gradient ascent (or gradient descent) is the first-order iterative optimization algorithm to find the max-
imum (or minimum) of a function. Recently, with the development of neural networks [70], gradient ascent
and gradient descent have become more popular.
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Consider the differentiable concave function f(θ). In order to find θ that maximizes f(θ), the iterative
scheme for the gradient ascent is:
θ(k+1) = θ(k) + η∇θ(k)f(θ(k)), (2.9)
where k is the number of iterations, θ(k) represents the parameter estimation after k-th iteration, η is the
learning rate, and ∇θ(k) is the gradient operator.
For the continuous concave function f(θ), theoretically, with a gradually decreasing learning rate η, the
gradient ascent can find the exact solution that maximizes f(θ). In practical implementation, however, the
iterative process is stopped when there is little change between θ(k+1) and θ(k).
2.7.2 Newton-Raphson
In addition to gradient ascent, another choice is the Newton-Raphson, which is a second-order iterative
optimization algorithm.
In the case that the target function f(θ) is concave and differentiable, for the solution θ0 that maximizes
f(θ), the first derivative of f(θ) should be 0:
∇θ0(f(θ0)) = 0, (2.10)
where ∇θ0 is the gradient operator.
To find the solution that makes the gradient to be 0, the second derivative is needed. The iterative
solution is:
θ(k+1) = θ(k) −∆−1
θ(k)
(f(θk))∇θ(k)(f(θk)), (2.11)
where k is the number of iterations and ∆θ(k) is the second derivative operator.
After sufficient number of iterations, Eq. 2.11 can approximate the solution that maximizes the target
function f(θ).
2.8 Neural Networks
Recently, neural networks [70], especially deep learning models, have been widely used for many problems,
such as computer vision and natural language processing. This section gives a brief description of feedforward
neural networks.
20
Neural network is a mathematical model that tries to approximate some function y = f̂(x), where x is
















Figure 2.6: Illustration of neural network.
This network has one input layer (x), two hidden layers (h1 and h2), and one output layer (y). For this
sample neural network, there are three input nodes (x1, x2, and x3). For the first hidden layer, there are













4). And for the output layer, there are 3 nodes (y1, y2, and y3). Except the input layer and output
layer, the number of hidden layers and number of nodes at each hidden layer are hyperparameters that need
to be decided by the user.
For each hidden layer and output layer, the input is the linear combination of previous layer’s output.






i , where there is assumed to be






i ), where a(·) is
a non-linear activation function. This process can be better illustrated using Fig. 2.7, where the input and
output of the first node in the first hidden layer is clearly shown.




















Figure 2.7: Illustration of neural network single node operation.
Through defining loss function, for example, mean squared error for regression problems or cross entropy
for classification problems, the neural network can be trained by minimizing the loss using the mechanism
called backpropagation [71]. The non-linear activation function is one of the key factors that give neural
network the capability to model complex functions. There are several commonly used non-linear activation
functions, such as sigmoid function, tanh function, and rectified linear unit (ReLU). The mathematical
formats are listed as follows:








ReLU function: a(x) =

0 if x < 0
x if x ≥ 0
. (2.14)
The above feedforward neural network is one of the most simple neural network structure. In addition
to feedforward neural network, there exist other neural networks, such as convoultional neural networks
(CNNs) [72, 73] and recurrent neural networks (RNNs) [71]. In this work, only feedforward neural work is
implemented for spectrum-based anomaly detection.
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2.9 Summary
Understanding the difference between background radiation and the radiation from SNM is important
for understanding the goals of this work, and understanding the signal collection process can help determine
the appropriate signals to be used for specific tasks. The performance metrics are important to evaluate
and compare different algorithms. Also, choosing the correct optimization techniques and algorithms is the
key to solving these problems. This chapter has given a brief overview of the technical background that is
important for this work. In the next chapter, the simulation and experiments conducted in this project are





Previous chapters defined the problem to be solved and gave technical background information needed for
this project. To test the techniques for nuclear radiation detection using mobile sensor networks, real-world
experiments would be ideal. However, large-scale and long-time deployment of mobile sensor networks in a
large urban environment is currently not feasible because of limited available resources. In addition, due to
safety concerns, it is hard to conduct experiments with actual radioactive sources. Based on these reasons,
simulation plays an important role in the evaluation of techniques used for nuclear radiation detection with
mobile sensor networks.
This chapter briefly describes experiments and simulations conducted in this work. More specifically, sec-
tion 3.2 describes the hardware and software used for experiments and synthetic data generation, section 3.3
discusses the simulations conducted for mobile sensor networks, and section 3.4 describes the details of the
experiment and simulated source injection process. The measured background radiation data and simulated
radioactive source data are used throughout this work.
3.2 Mobile Sensor Network Platform
3.2.1 Mobile Sensors
Mobile sensors play the most important role in mobile sensor network systems. The sensors should
be able to collect GPS location, radiation level, timestamps, and possibly weather conditions in real time.
Collected data should be saved and made available for analysis in real time. Data will be even more useful
if data from all mobile sensors are available for analysis simultaneously, in real time.
However, most available detectors themselves do not have the capability to transmit the collected infor-
mation to a central location. Thus, each sensor should contain two parts: a gamma-ray detector to collect
radiation data, and a second device to collect and transmit radiation and location information. In this work,
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a smart phone is used to transmit such information. A picture of a mobile sensor containing a D3S detector
and a smart phone is shown in Fig. 3.1.
Figure 3.1: D3S detector and cell phone as single mobile sensor.
The small detector used in this work is from Kromek Group plc, which is called the Discreet Dual
Detector, or D3S detector. D3S detector is a hybrid gamma/neutron detector used for national security
applications. As a 132 mm× 80 mm× 23.5 mm CsI(Tl) detector for gamma-ray detection, D3S detector’s
gamma-ray energy range is from 30 keV to 3 MeV . The detector is Bluetooth enabled. It can collect
data for every second and then transmit the data wirelessly to the smart phone through Bluetooth. The
phone used in this work is a Samsung Galaxy S6 smart phone. It is used to record the corresponding GPS
location information and timestamps. A mobile software application was also developed by the research
group [4, 38, 74, 75] to connect the smart phone and the Amazon cloud. Through the application, the D3S
detectors and smart phones can collect data every second and then transmit the data into cloud with some
latency (e.g., around 10 minutes using current application [75]), which enables timely processing and analysis.
For more information about the radiation detectors used in this work, see Appendix A.
3.2.2 Synthetic Data Generation
The portable mobile sensors described previously make it easy to collect and transmit data. However, due
to safety concerns, actual radioactive sources are not used in this work. Instead, synthetic data are simulated
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using GADRAS software1. GADRAS can simulate the background radiation for different locations as well
as the radiation from various isotopes, such as 54Mn, 137Cs, and 60Co. Its performance has been validated
by a series of benchmark sources [78] and analyzed by Stinnett [79]. Two types of detectors, D3S detector
and Ortec 905 NaI detector2, are simulated for this work.
The simulated data contain two parts, radiation from background and radiation from radioactive sources.
For background radiation, to better reflect the spatial variation, the background radiation is simulated based
on radiation levels in Chicago and Salt Lake City, covering both low background (Chicago) and relatively
high background radiation (Salt Lake City) cases. According to the simulated data from GADRAS, the
average and standard deviation of background radiation level in Chicago for D3S detectors is 31.3 cps and
5.6 cps, and they are 38.6 cps and 6.2 cps for Salt Lake City. For radiation from radioactive sources, the
radiation field is simulated within a radius of 20 m around the source to reflect the influence of distance on
radiation. A schematic diagram of the simulation process for radioactive sources is shown in Fig. 3.2. In the
simulated region, multiple spectra are simulated for the future sampling purpose at discrete distances (for
example, every 0.5 m) from the source. For more details on the synthetic data simulation process and how




Figure 3.2: Schematic diagram of radioactive source spectrum simulation process. The spectra are simulated
at different distances from the radioactive source.
1Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS) is a spectrum simulation and analysis software developed
and maintained by Sandia National Laboratories [76,77]. For more details about GADRAS, see Appendix B.
2See Appendix A for technical details of D3S detector and Ortec 905 NaI detector.
26
Once the background radiation spectrum and the radioactive source spectrum are simulated or collected,
based on the assumption that the radiation from background and radioactive sources are two independent
processes, the spectrum that will be measured by a detector is simply the sum of two spectra. This process
is illustrated in Fig. 3.3, where the spectra for background radiation and 137Cs source with 1 µCi source
intensity as well as the combined spectrum are shown for the D3S detector (Fig. 3.3a) and Ortec 905 NaI
detector (Fig. 3.3b).
































Figure 3.3: Illustration of synthetic data superposition process. The background and radioactive source
spectra are simulated using GADRAS for D3S detector and NaI detector. The 1 µCi 137Cs source is placed
1 meter away from the detector. All spectra are simulated for 1 hour.
To study the influence of source intensity on the performance of mobile sensor networks, the radiation
propagation from 137Cs with increasing intensities (100 µCi, 300 µCi, 500 µCi, 1,000 µCi, and 2,000 µCi)
are simulated for the D3S detector and Ortec 905 detector3. The simulated source intensities in counts per
second (cps) for different detectors are shown in Table 3.1.
3In this work, since most part only uses the count rate information, the exact isotope category is not very important. The 5
different source intensities are selected to cover the scenarios from very low source intensity (e.g., 100 µCi) to relatively strong
source intensity (e.g., 2,000 µCi). These analyses can be easily extended to the cases with stronger shielded radioactive sources.
27
Table 3.1: Simulated Source (137Cs) Intensity in Counts Per Second for D3S Detector and Ortec 905 Detector






Note: source intensity is defined to be the average count rate measured by a given type of detector that is
placed 1 m away from the source without shielding effect. The unit is counts per second (cps).
3.3 Simulation
In this work, based on the synthetic data simulated using GADRAS, a simulation platform is developed
to model the scenario in which multiple radiation detectors randomly move around the city. A simulated
city map with multiple mobile sensors is shown in Fig. 3.4. The map is segmented into a 6 × 6 grid of 36
blocks. Each block represents one city block. The size of each block is 100 m× 80 m and the width of roads
is 10 m. Mobile sensors are denoted by (blue) rectangles while four fixed radioactive sources are denoted by
(red) circles.
In the simulation, 50 detectors are assumed to randomly move only along the roads (only 16 are shown in
Fig. 3.4), and they are restricted to move along the roads only. Each detector is assumed to have a constant
speed, which is sampled from uniform distribution in the range of 1.4 m/s to 1.8 m/s. When the detector
moves to the intersection of roads, it has equal probability to move along the original direction, turn left, or
turn right. It is assumed to not make “U” turn at the intersection4. When the detector reaches the boundary
of the simulated area, it is assumed to turn around and the simulation continues. In other cases, the detectors
are assumed to only move along the original direction. Radioactive sources are placed at different locations.
Four typical source locations5 are shown in Fig. 3.4, where source 1 and source 2 are placed in the middle of
the roads, while source 3 and source 4 are placed 5 m off the roads. For scenarios corresponding to sources
1 and 2, since detectors can only move along the roads, the shielding effect of the surrounding buildings is
4In real cases, “U” turn might happen and the detector may have higher probability to go straight than turning left or
turning right. Here, there are some simplifications for detectors’ movement. But this kind of simplification has little influence
on the conclusion.
5These 4 cases are used to represent the typical source locations. In the actual simulation, there are multiple source
locations for each case. For example, for scenario 2 where source is placed at the intersection, there are multiple simulations
where simulated sources are placed at different intersections.
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ignored. But for scenarios corresponding to sources 3 and 4, the shielding effect needs to be considered. In
this work, given that the simulated source is relatively weak, the linear attenuation coefficient is assumed







Figure 3.4: Illustration of simulated city map.
For each detector, radiation data and location information are collected every second. The collected
data include detector ID, timestamps, exact location information, background radiation count rate, source
radiation count rate, and possibly the whole spectrum. The background radiation count rate is sampled
from the simulated database described in section 3.2.2 based on its location. For example, when the detector
moves to the low background radiation region, its count rate is sampled from the simulated data based on
Chicago. When it moves to the high background radiation region, its count rate is sampled from the
simulated data based on Salt Lake City. For the count rate from radioactive sources, if the detector is far
away from radioactive source (e.g., more than 20 m away), the value would be 0. If the detector is close to
the radioactive source, its distance to the source is calculated and the corresponding source count rate is
sampled from the simulated radioactive source data at the corresponding distance. This process is repeated
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for every second during the simulation6.
The simulated background radiation map is shown in Fig. 3.5. To better reflect the spatial variation of
background radiation, the lower left part of the simulated area is set to have a higher background radiation
level. The high background radiation region and low background radiation region can be roughly separated
by the dashed curve on the figure. The radius of high background radiation region is around 400 meters.
The background radiation data simulated based on Salt Lake City are used to represent the high background
radiation, and the simulated radiation data from Chicago are used to represent the low background radiation.
Figure 3.5 shows the average background radiation level. Point values are estimated using the measurements
from surrounding 30 meters region. The average count rate at position A is 38.5 cps, while the average count
rate at position B is 31.3 cps.
A
B
Figure 3.5: Illustration of simulated background radiation. Radiation data are simulated using GADRAS
for D3S detectors. Higher background radiation region is located in the lower left part.
6See Appendix E for more details about the simulation process.
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3.4 Experiment and Source Injection
In addition to simulation, an experiment with a small mobile sensor network system [4, 38, 74, 75] was
conducted by the author on the engineering campus of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign to
test the proposed algorithms in near-real cases.
The experiment was conducted in an outdoor region of approximately 500 × 400 m2 in area. During
the experiment, operators who carried D3S detectors walked at the normal speed (around 1.4 m/s) in the
experimental area. The experimental area and the walking paths are shown in Fig. 3.6. The operators walked
along the designated paths for multiple times. D3S detectors were placed in their pockets. The recorded
data include the detector’s ID, latitude, longitude, radiation counts per second, and the corresponding
timestamps7. More detailed description of experimental procedures and collected data are included in
Appendix F.
Figure 3.6 shows locations8 of each measurement and the background radiation level in the experimental
area. Clearly, background radiation level increases near the buildings. Three typical high background
radiation regions are denoted using dashed rectangles, A, B, and C. The background radiation level at other
places, such as the lawn and parking lot, is lower.
7The recorded location information might have certain errors. In this work, the recorded location is treated as the actual
location and source injection is based on the recorded location information. Thus, the GPS error has little influence on this
work.
8The original data only have longitude and latitude information. By setting location with longitude equals -88.229402 and
latitude equals 40.109666 as the origin, the locations of measurements and buildings can be transformed (using meter) according















Figure 3.6: Illustration of experimental area, background radiation measurements, radioactive source lo-
cations, and source injection process. Three relatively high background regions are denoted using dashed
rectangles A, B, and C.
During the experiment, the data were collected in the morning and afternoon by the author, and there
were no radioactive sources placed in the experimental region. After collecting the background radiation
data, next step is to inject the simulated radioactive source into the measured background data to obtain
the “injected” experimental data. Here, the radiation data collected in the morning are used to model
the background radiation and the radiation data collected in the afternoon are used to inject simulated
radioactive sources. Using GADRAS, the source information of 137Cs with 5 different intensities (127 cps,
380 cps, 626 cps, 1,220 cps, and 2,354 cps) were simulated. These radioactive sources were injected into the
experimental region at 10 different randomly selected locations, which are denoted by numbers inside the
circle (from 1 through 10) in Fig. 3.6. To test the performance of the proposed algorithm under different
cases, the radioactive sources were injected at 3 different distances (1 m, 5 m, and 10 m) from the walking
paths. So, for each injected source location, there are 15 different scenarios in total (5 different source
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intensities and 3 different distances). The detailed locations of injected radioactive sources are listed in
Table 3.2. Each column represents the location of one source injection location, and rows show different
injection distances, from 1 m to 10 m.
Table 3.2: Relative Locations of Injected Radioactive Sources
Configuration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 m away
x dir. (m) 55.9 54.8 310.7 446.8 450.6 172.7 86.5 360.9 453.7 167.9
y dir. (m) 196.9 328.8 330.6 331.4 281.7 245.4 23.6 50.5 179.1 204.5
5 m away
x dir. (m) 59.9 58.6 306.7 443.0 447.2 176.1 86.5 358.1 450.4 171.4
y dir. (m) 200.5 324.8 326.6 328.4 285.7 243.4 27.7 53.3 176.6 206.2
10 m away
x dir. (m) 65.0 63.7 301.8 441.5 442.3 180.4 86.6 354.9 446.5 175.4
y dir. (m) 205.2 320.0 321.2 323.5 290.8 241.5 32.7 56.8 173.8 209.2
The relative source location is calculated by the distance to the origin, which has longitude equals
-88.229402 and latitude equals 40.109666. The location is transformed into meters in both x and y
directions.
After injecting the simulated radioactive source, the measured radiation count rates from nearby locations
are influenced. This process is shown in Fig. 3.7. When the simulated source is injected, the measured count
rates within certain distance from the injected source would increase. For example, the count rates within
the dashed circle in Fig. 3.7b are increased by a certain level determined by the distance from the injected
sources and the source intensity. For the locations that are far away from the injected sources, there is
almost no influence on radiation count rate.
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(a) Before source injection. (b) After source injection.
Figure 3.7: Illustration of synthetic source injection process. After source injection, the radiation level
around the injected sources is increased.
3.5 Summary
This chapter briefly describes the hardware and software used for experiments and simulations, detailed
experimental procedures conducted using a small mobile sensor network system, and the simulation platform
built for this project. In the following chapters, the experimentally collected and simulator generated data
are used to evaluate the proposed methods for anomaly detection and source localization.
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Chapter 4
Mobile Sensor Network Systematic
Assessment
4.1 Introduction
There are many factors that influence the performance of mobile sensor networks, such as radiation
detectors, number of detectors, radiation detection algorithms and so on. It is important to understand
the influence of these factors on the performance of mobile sensor networks. This chapter first gives an
assessment of mobile sensor network system using a modified k-sigma method for anomaly detection. The
influence of detector characteristics and the number of detectors is then discussed. The simulated data
obtained from the simulation platform as described in Chapter 3 are used to quantify the influence.
4.2 Regional Detection
As mentioned in Section 1.3, various anomaly detection techniques for radiation detection have been
proposed and studied. Traditional anomaly detection methods are mainly based on gross count rate. There
is increasing interest in spectrum-based anomaly detection techniques.
One of the most widely used methods is the so-called k-sigma method. The traditional k-sigma method
uses the deviation of the measurement from the estimated background radiation as the anomaly score [11,38].





where ASkσ stands for the anomaly score of the k-sigma method, x is the measured gross count rate, µ is
the background radiation level, which is usually estimated using the average of surrounding measurements,
and σ is the estimated background radiation standard deviation.
The anomaly score calculated using the k-sigma method has no limit on its range, which means that
the anomaly score can be very large. It is desirable to define an anomaly score that is bounded within a
range, so that the ROC curve and AUC can be better calculated. Suppose the desired range is from 0 to 1,
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through normalization by dividing the maximum probability Poi(bxe;µ), the calculated Poisson probability






Poi(bxe;µ) x ≤ µ
1− 12
Poi(x;µ)
Poi(bxe;µ) x > µ
, (4.2)
where Poi(x;µ) refers to the probability calculated from Poisson distribution as defined in Eq. 2.1, bxe is
the nearest integer of x, and µ is the estimated background radiation. The anomaly score defined in Eq. 4.2
is bounded over the range of [0, 1]. Variation of Poisson anomaly score ASp(x) as a function of k-sigma
anomaly score ASkσ(x) is shown in Fig. 4.1.
























Figure 4.1: Relationship of Poisson anomaly score and k-sigma anomaly score.
The estimation of µ is the key to successfully characterizing abnormal measurements. With stationary
detectors, this task can be accomplished using the historical measurements from single detector. With
mobile sensor networks, however, it is challenging to get continuous measurements from fixed positions.
Two strategies can be applied to address this challenge. The first strategy is to use the measurements across
the entire region to estimate the background radiation at the desired location. The anomaly score from this
method is named the “global” anomaly score. On the other hand, the background radiation can also be
estimated from a small region around the point of interest. The anomaly score from this method is named
the “regional” anomaly score or the “local” anomaly score. For the global anomaly score, it is easy and
efficient to retrieve all the data to estimate the background radiation. But it ignores the spatial variation
of background radiation. On the other hand, the regional anomaly score needs to estimate background
radiation level µ for different locations, which is less efficient, especially when the historical data volume is
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large (as will be discussed in Chapter 5, certain methods, such as Poisson kriging, can be used to estimate
the background radiation level for locations where no measurements were collected).
To compare the performance of global and regional anomaly detection techniques, the simulation platform
described in Chapter 3 is used to simulate the scenario where 50 mobile D3S detectors randomly move in
the experimental region. Each detector is assumed to have a constant speed, which is sampled from uniform
distribution in the range of 1.4 m/s to 1.8 m/s. The simulation continues for 1 hour. Thirteen radioactive
sources are placed at the intersection of roads1. The results of global and regional anomaly detection methods
are shown in Fig. 4.2.
A
B
(a) Global anomaly score distribution.
A
B
(b) Regional anomaly score distribution.
Figure 4.2: Comparison of global and regional anomaly detection methods. 13 radioactive sources are placed
at the intersections of roads, denoted by yellow color.
In Fig. 4.2, high background region is in the lower left part and the center of yellow dots represent the
location of radioactive sources. For the global method in Fig. 4.2a, the average background radiation level
is 33.96 cps and the standard deviation is 6.8 cps. For the regional method, the local background radiation
level is estimated using the measurements within 30 meters and the average background radiation changes
spatially as shown in Fig. 3.5. When the background radiation is estimated using the data from the entire
region, the background radiation estimation, not surprisingly, overestimates the background radiation in
the low background radiation region but underestimates the background radiation in the high background
radiation region. In other words, it increases the false positive rate in the high background radiation region
but reduces the true positive rate in the low background radiation region. This is better reflected in Fig. 4.2a,
where the anomaly score is much higher in the lower left region compared with Fig. 4.2b. On the other hand,
the background radiation estimated using regional measurements can reflect the true background radiation
1The exact locations of radioactive sources have little influence on the conclusion. For more details about the simulation,
see Appendix E.
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level, thus leading to overall better performance.
To better quantify the difference, using the calculated anomaly score shown in Fig. 4.2a and Fig. 4.2b,
by setting different threshold values, true positive rate and false positive rate can be calculated. The ROC
curves of global and regional methods based on calculated true positive rate and false positive rate are shown
in Fig. 4.3.




















Figure 4.3: ROC curves of global and regional anomaly detection methods (regional method uses the data
from surrounding 30 m radius to estimate the background radiation).
As shown in Fig. 4.3, the regional method is better than the global method, but the improvement is not
large. This is because that the background radiation spatial variation, which is shown in Fig. 3.5, is not very
large. When the spatial variation is larger, the improvement is expected to increase. In the global method, the
background radiation only needs to be estimated once for the entire region. But for the regional method, this
process needs to be repeated multiple times for the studied region, and each time, nearby measurements need
to be queried from the database. These procedures will dramatically increase the computational complexity.
In practical implementation, the background radiation spatial variation and computational complexity need
to be considered together to make the appropriate choice between the regional and the global approaches.
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4.3 Influence of Detector Characteristics
In addition to radiation detection algorithms, another factor that influences the performance of mobile
sensor networks is the characteristic of radiation detectors. Different detectors may consist of different
materials and have different sizes. These factors will affect the quality of the collected signals.
The influence of detector characteristics can be well quantified using the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
In the nuclear radiation detection field, since the background radiation is generally considered as noise,
the standard deviation of background radiation is used to represent the level of noise. The signal refers
to the radiation from radioactive sources, which is simply the difference of measured signal and estimated








where s is the count rate from radioactive sources, x is the the measured count rate by the detector, and b
represents the estimated background radiation.
There are different kinds of detectors. Here, two typical detectors, D3S and Ortec-905, are simulated
using GADRAS. During the simulation, a 137Cs source with source intensity of 500 µCi (626 cps) is used.
The detectors are placed 1 m high above the ground. Simulated data are obtained at different distances
from the radioactive source. SNRs are calculated using Eq. 4.3. The exact values for measured source count
rate s and calculated the SNR using Eq. 4.3 at different distances are listed in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Source Intensity and SNR at Different Distances without Shielding
Configuration
Distance to Radioactive Source
1 m 3 m 5 m 7 m 9 m
D3S Detector
s (cps) 644.05 81.75 33.25 16.35 11.55
SNR 116.64 14.64 6.12 3.10 2.11
Ortec 905 Detector
s (cps) 3369.25 605.85 255.85 174.50 91.60
SNR 307.72 54.86 22.74 11.39 6.18
In the simulation, the 500 µCi (626 cps) 137Cs source is placed in front of the detectors. There is no
shielding materials between the source and the detectors.
The plot of SNR versus distance to the 137Cs source is shown in Fig. 4.4. As the distance of the detector
from the radioactive source increases, the SNR decreases dramatically for both detectors. And the SNR
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for the Ortec 905 detector, not surprisingly, is much larger than that for the D3S detector with the same
settings. However, better detectors are more expensive, and thus a trade-off between fewer more expensive
detectors versus a large number of low cost detectors needs to be made.
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Figure 4.4: Comparing the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of Ortec 905-3 detector and D3S detector. The error
bar is shown with one standard error.
4.4 Influence of Number of Detectors
Among all the influencing factors, the number of detectors2 is certainly one important factor that de-
termines the performance of mobile sensor networks. The number of detectors directly determines the
probability of the radioactive source being detected within a limited time period. In other words, the num-
ber of detectors determines the time for the radioactive source to be detected, and finally determines the
performance of the mobile sensor networks for nuclear radiation detection.
As more and more mobile detectors are deployed in the experimental region, the chance that the ra-
dioactive sources being detected is expected to increase. As a result, the time needed to detect the source
decreases. In this work, the time needed to detect the source is defined as the time it takes one detector to
reach within 10 meters of the source, or called reachable time. To better quantify the influence of the num-
ber of detectors, the simulation platform as described in Chapter 3 is used. The simulation is the same as
2It is more reasonable to use detector density instead of number of detectors for similar analyses. Here, since all simulations
are conducted over the same area, the number of detectors can represent detector density.
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described in Section 3.3, in which each detector is randomly moving with constant speed uniformly sampled
from 1.4 m/s to 1.8 m/s. Thirteen simulated radioactive sources are placed at the intersection of roads3.
The number of detectors is varied from 10 to 100, and the average reachable time is calculated for each case.
The results are shown in Fig. 4.5.


























Figure 4.5: Average reachable time versus number of detectors. Error bar is shown with one standard error.
The simulated map is shown in Fig. 3.4, which has the area of 650 m × 530 m.
As shown in Fig. 4.5, with more detectors, as expected, the average reachable time decreases. And as
will be shown in Chapter 6, more detectors can reduce the time to locate the radioactive sources as well
as increase the source localization accuracy. This is obviously to be expected. The goal of this exercise is
to estimate the optimal number of detectors beyond which a marginal improvement in performance is not
worth the additional cost4. It is clear that, as the number of detectors increases, the average reachable time
decreases fast at first, then decreases slower and finally tends to saturate after the number of detectors is
large enough. The optimal number of detectors for the current simulation setting (area covered and sources)
seems to be between 30 and 40 considering the trade-off between cost and performance5.
3For more details about the simulation, see Appendix E.
4Currently, a D3S detector costs about $5,800.
5Number of detectors is not the only factor that influences the reachable time. Another factor is the detector’s moving speed.
When detectors are moving slowly, it is expected to take a longer time for the radioactive source to be detected. However,
when the speed is increased, although the reachable time is decreased, the quality of the collected data may get worse. This
is because that when detector moves faster, the measured signal will contain more information from background since it will
travel a longer distance.
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To see the influence of number of detectors on the performance of mobile sensor networks for anomaly
detection, under the same simulation settings, the number of detectors is again varied over 10 to 100 and the
area under the curve (AUC) with the anomaly detection technique as described in Section 4.2 is calculated.
The results are shown in Fig. 4.6.


















Figure 4.6: Area under the ROC curve with different number of detectors. The error bar is shown with one
standard error (Due to the randomness in simulation, there are some fluctuations with the error bars).
As shown in Fig. 4.6, in a limited amount of time, increasing the number of mobile detectors as expected
improves the performance of mobile sensor networks for anomaly detection, especially when the number
of detectors is less than 40. However, the improvement diminishes when the number of detectors is large
enough, which is consistent with the results shown in Fig. 4.5. Figure 4.6 again suggests that the optimal
number of detectors to be between 30 and 40. The reason behind the saturation when detector number is
larger than 40 is that current anomaly detection is based on single measurement from each detector. Once
the estimated background radiation level is fixed, increasing the number of detectors will not change the
Poisson anomaly score of each measurement.
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4.5 Summary
Analysis of the performance of mobile sensor networks under different settings is presented in this chapter.
Focused on anomaly detection, the influence of anomaly detection algorithms, detector characteristics, and
the number of detectors are studied in detail. As expected, regional detection algorithms, better radiation
detectors, and more detectors can help improve the mobile sensor network’s performance for nuclear radiation
detection. But this improvement may become negligible with increasing quality and quantity of radiation
detectors. The trade-off between cost and performance is always important when designing mobile sensor
networks for radiation detection. Through simulation, this chapter quantifies the influence of each factor,
and can provide guidance for the actual deployment of mobile sensor networks.
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Chapter 5
Poisson Kriging for Background
Radiation Estimation and Anomalous
Source Detection
5.1 Introduction
The influence of different parameters on the performance of mobile sensor networks were reported in
Chapter 4. The final goal of mobile sensor networks, however, is not only to distinguish the abnormal mea-
surements from normal background measurements, but also to locate the radioactive sources. The method
proposed in Section 4.2 works when the background radiation is available. But there are cases in which
mobile sensor networks can only cover part of the physical area, and background radiation measurements
are not available for the rest of regions. In this case, it is necessary to develop methods to estimate the
background radiation levels for regions where background radiation data are not available using measured
data. In this chapter, Poisson kriging, which is based on geospatial modeling, is implemented to estimate
the background radiation levels as well as to detect the anomalous radioactive sources.
The first law of geography [80] states that “everything is related to everything else, but near things are
more related than distant things”. This law also works for nuclear radiation, especially background radiation.
Nuclear radiation measures the radiation levels at specific locations and times, which are influenced by
many factors. Given that radiation measurements are usually discrete in space and time, it is important to
estimate the background radiation levels for unmeasured locations using the measurements from surrounding
locations.
Kriging is a geostatistical interpolation method that uses the given measurements to interpolate data at
positions where data were not collected [81]. There are several commonly used kriging models, including
ordinary kriging, simple kriging, and universal kriging. For radiation detection, all measurements are inte-
gers, and the signals are assumed to follow the Poisson distribution. In this case, the often-used Gaussian
assumption is not suitable for modeling radiation data since the radiation might have relatively low mean
values and the measurements are discrete. Also, for radiation data, goal is to estimate the distribution of
nuclear radiation levels, which can be represented as the average radiation count rate, using the meaured
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radiation count rate data. Therefore, it is more reasonable to use the Poisson kriging approach1. Monestiez
et al. [82] proposed Poisson kriging to model the spatial distribution of Balaenoptera physalus (a kind of
whale) using the sparse count data. McShane et al. [83] developed a similar model to analyze the spatially
correlated count data. Recently, Bellier et al. [84] extended Poisson kriging to nonstationary hierarchical
model for count data. Since then, Poisson kriging has been implemented in different areas, including cholera
and dysentery incidence [85], cancer [86,87], and wildlife population [82,84].
This chapter is focused on the application of Poisson kriging method for estimating nuclear radiation
distribution using mobile sensor networks. More precisely, section 5.2 focuses on the theory behind Poisson
kriging, and its implementation for background radiation estimation. Section 5.3 discusses anomalous source
detection problem using Poisson kriging. The performance of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated using
the measured data in which simulated radioactive sources are injected.
5.2 Poisson Kriging and Background Radiation Estimation
5.2.1 Poisson Kriging
The raw nuclear radiation data measured using various radiation detectors are in integer format, which
are assumed to follow the Poisson distribution [58]. Poisson kriging was originally developed based on
the population weighted semi-variogram estimators and used to analyze the count data [82]. Compared
with other kriging methods, Poisson kriging assumes that measured data follow Poisson distribution. The
probability of a detector collects m counts in a unit time with expectation λ is expressed as:




where λ represents the average radiation count rate at given position.
For radiation measurements, let random observation Xr be the count rate measurement at location r.
There exists some underlying distribution Yr which represents the expected value of Xr. In other words, Yr
represents λ in Eq. 5.1 at position r. The goal of Poisson kriging is to estimate the distribution of Y using
measured X. Given latent variable Yr, measured radiation count rate Xr is assumed to follow the Poisson
distribution:
Xr|Yr ∼ Poisson(Yr). (5.2)
1More specifically, compared with tranditional kriging or Gaussian process, Poisson kriging explicitly assumes that measured
data follow Poisson distribution and it is used to model discrete integer values. Also, Poisson kriging aims to model the hidden
variable, instead of directly modeling the measured radiation count rate.
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Further, Yr is assumed to be a positive random field with mean µr and variance σ
2
r [82]. To simplify the
problem, µr and σ
2
r are assumed to be constant [88]
2. Then it follows that:
E[Yr] = µ (5.3)
E[Y 2r ] = µ
2 + σ2. (5.4)
Based on the above assumptions, the conditional expectation and variance of Xr, given expectation Yr,
can be calculated as follows [82]:
E[Xr|Yr] = Yr (5.5)
V ar[Xr|Yr] = Yr (5.6)
E[X2r |Yr] = Yr + Y 2r (5.7)
E[Xr] = E[E[Xr|Yr]] = µ (5.8)
V ar[Xr] = E[E[X
2
r |Yr]]− E2[Xr] = µ+ σ2 (5.9)
E[XrXr′ |Y ] = Cov(Xr, Xr′ |Y ) + E[Xr|Yr]E[Xr′ |Yr′ ] = δr,r′Yr + YrYr′ , (5.10)
where δr,r′ is the delta function (1 if r = r
′ and 0 otherwise).
For Poisson kriging, considering two locations r and r′, the observed radiation count rate Xr is assumed
to not interact with Xr′ directly. Instead, the average radiation level Yr are assumed to be connected with
Yr′ through their covariance. The covariance function CY (r, r
′) = Cov(Yr, Yr′) for Y is assumed to depend
only on the distance ||r − r′|| between two locations:
CY (r, r
′) = E[(Yr − µ)(Yr′ − µ)] = E[YrYr′ ]− µ2 (5.11)
2For non-constant mean cases, the trend can be estimated first and the problem is still solvable. See reference [84] for more
details.
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E[(Xr −Xr′)2|Y ] = E[X2r |Yr]− 2E[XrXr′ |Y ] + E[X2r′ |Yr′ ]
= Y 2r + Yr + Y
2
r′ + Yr′ − 2δr,r′Yr − 2YrYr′
= Yr + Yr′ − 2δr,r′Yr + (Yr − Yr′)2
(5.12)
E[(Xr −Xr′)2] = E[E[(Xr −Xr′)2|Y ]]
= E[Yr] + E[Yr′ ]− 2E[δr,r′Yr] + E[(Yr − Yr′)2]
= 2µ− 2δr,r′µ+ E[(Yr − Yr′)2].
(5.13)
Traditionally, it is more common to use the semi-variogram instead of covariance to model the correlation.
The semi-variogram γ(r, r′) was first defined by Matheron [89] as half of the average squared difference




V ar(Z(r)− Z(r′)), (5.14)
where Z(r) is the measured value and V ar(·) is the variance. Here, for the measured radiation count rate
X, the semi-variogram functions for X can be further simplified as γX(r, r
′) = 12E[(Xr −Xr′)
2] based on
Eq. 5.14. From Eq. 5.13, the semi-variogram function for Y can be calculated as:
γY (r, r
′) = γX(r, r
′) + δr,r′µ− µ. (5.15)
From Eq. 5.11 and Eq. 5.15, the covariance function CY (r, r




′) = σ2 − γY (r, r′). (5.16)
For radiation detection with multiple detectors, suppose that there are n measurements X1, X2, · · · , Xn
from different locations r1, r2, · · · , rn, the estimate of Y0 for the unknown position r0 is assumed to be the





The problem becomes of finding λ1, λ2, · · · , λn such that Eq. 5.17 works as the optimal estimator so that
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the estimator Ŷ0 is unbiased and the squared estimation error E[(Ŷ0−Y0)2] is minimized. More specifically,











λi = 1. (5.19)
Further, E[(Ŷ0 − Y0)2] can be derived as:
E[(Ŷ0 − Y0)2|Y ] = E[(
n∑
i=1































































2 + µ2 + σ2.
(5.21)
From the unbiased condition in Eq. 5.18 and Eq. 5.19, Eq. 5.21 can be simplified as:











λiCY (i, 0) + σ
2. (5.22)
And the variance of the estimation V ar(Ŷ0 − Y0) is:




















λi = 1 (5.24)
n∑
j=1
λjCY (i, j) + λiµ+ α = CY (i, 0) for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, (5.25)
where α is the Lagrange multiplier. The prediction variance can be calculated as:
V ar(Ŷ0 − Y0) = σ2 −
n∑
i=1
λiCY (i, 0)− α. (5.26)
Equation 5.24 and Eq. 5.25 can be written in matrix format Ax = b. A is a (n+1) by (n+1) matrix, and
x and b are both column vectors with (n+ 1) elements. To simplify the expression, Cij is used to represent
the CY (i, j). More precisely,
A =

C11 + µ C12 C13 · · · C1n 1
C21 C22 + µ C23 · · · C2n 1







Cn1 Cn2 Cn3 · · · Cnn + µ 1
1 1 1 · · · 1 0

(5.27)
x = (λ1, λ2, λ3, · · · , λn, α)T (5.28)
b = (C10, C20, C30, · · · , Cn0, 1)T . (5.29)
5.2.2 Implementation
The previous section describes the mathematics behind the Poisson kriging model, which leads to solving
Ax = b. From Eq. 5.27, Eq. 5.28, and Eq. 5.29, the key to solving the Poisson kriging problem is to
calculate the covariance function Cij . Since Cij = CY (i, j) = σ
2 − γY (i, j), to estimate Cij , the semi-
variogram function γY (i, j) needs to be estimated first. Semi-variogram function γY (i, j) is assumed to be
determined by the distance dij = ||ri − rj || only, which is denoted by γ̂Y (dij).
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Based on Eq. 5.15, the semi-variogram function of Y can be calculated from the semi-variogram of X,















i,j Idij≈h. Idij≈h is the indicator function which is 1 when the distance between ri and rj
is roughly equal to h. Otherwise, this indicator function is equal to 0. From Eq. 5.15, the semi-variogram
function γY (h) can be easily inferred.
Equation 5.30 only gives discrete estimates of γ̂X(h). To get a continuous estimate, a semi-variogram
model can be fitted based on the calculated γ̂X(h) for discrete distance h. Commonly used semi-variogram
models [81] include:
Nugget model: g(h) =

c0 if h = 0
c0 + c otherwise
(5.31)
Spherical model: g(h) =

c0 + c · (1.5 · (ha )− 0.5 · (
h
a )
3) if h ≤ a
c0 + c otherwise
(5.32)

















Power model: g(h) = c0 + c · hω with 0 < ω < 2. (5.35)






is used3. The parameters c0, c, and
a are determined using the measured data.
5.2.3 Background Radiation Estimation
Previous sections described the mathematics behind the Poisson kriging model and necessary procedures
to implement the model. To test the performance of the Poisson kriging model for background radiation
3Spherical, exponential, and Gaussian models have similar shapes, and the results are quite similar. The fitting model can
be chosen based on minimizing the mean squared error of the fitted semi-variogram model or from previous research work [82].
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estimation, background radiation data were measured using D3S detectors. The collected background ra-
diation measurements described in section 3.4 are shown in Fig. 5.1, in which high background radiation
regions are around the buildings, such as the statue and the church.
Figure 5.1: Background radiation measurements. Data were collected using D3S detectors in the outdoor
environment.
The data collection was continued through the entire day. Using the background radiation data measured
in the morning, discrete values for semi-variogram are calculated using Eq. 5.30. The calculated values and
the fitted exponential semi-variogram model are shown in Fig. 5.2. The figure clearly shows that, for small
distances, as the distance increases, the semi-variogram value increases. Since semi-variogram is negatively
correlated with covariance, this trend is consistent with the expectation that radiation measurements are less
correlated as distance increases. As the distance keeps increasing, the increase of semi-variogram diminishes
and finally it tends to saturate. This is also consistent with the expectation that as the distance becomes
large enough, there is no correlation between the two locations.
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Figure 5.2: Semi-variogram plot of background radiation measurements.
Based on the estimated semi-variogram function shown in Fig. 5.2 and the background radiation mea-
surements shown in Fig. 5.1, the continuous distribution estimation of background radiation levels is shown
in Fig. 5.3. Compared with Fig. 5.1, Fig. 5.3 provides the smooth distribution of background radiation, and
the high background radiation regions near the buildings can be easily identified.
Figure 5.3: Poisson kriging estimation of background radiation distribution.
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Also, based on Eq. 5.26, the standard deviation of the estimation can be easily calculated. The standard
deviation corresponding to Fig. 5.3 is show in Fig. 5.4. As expected, there is less uncertainty for the
locations that are close to radiation measurements. For the locations that are far away from any radiation
measurements, the uncertainty is much larger.
Figure 5.4: Distribution of standard deviation for Poisson kriging estimation.
5.3 Poisson Kriging for Anomalous Source Detection
5.3.1 Anomalous Source Detection
The details of Poisson kriging model and its application to background radiation estimation were covered
in section 5.2. Background radiation estimation is usually the first step for nuclear radiation detection.
Given the radiation data collected from mobile sensor networks, the ultimate goal is to detect and locate
the radioactive sources. The application of Poisson kriging for anomalous source detection is discussed in
this section.
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After the mobile sensor network is established, normal background radiation data can be easily obtained
since radiation detectors continuously collect radiation data in the experimental region covered by the
mobile sensor network. Considering the fact that incidents involving nuclear radiation have extremely low
probability, most of the data should contain no information about radioactive sources. Using the measured
background radiation data, the background radiation distribution can be obtained using the Poisson kriging
model as described in the previous section. This distribution will then become the base against which new
data will be compared for source detection and localization. Once new measurements are obtained, different
methods can then be applied to detect the anomalous radioactive sources.
For the experimental data shown in Fig. 5.1, the data collected in the morning is used to estimate
the background radiation levels using Poisson kriging. For the data collected in the afternoon, synthetic
radioactive sources are injected with different source intensity and locations, as described in section 3.4.
Figure 5.5 shows the new measurements after source injection. In this sample case, a 100 µCi 137Cs
radioactive source is injected 1 meter away from the walking path, at the location denoted by a red cross
inside the circle.
+
Figure 5.5: Radiation measurements with synthetic source injection. The injected source is denoted by the
red cross inside the circle (the exact location is: x=55.87 m, y=196.93 m).
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Point Data Based Method
After obtaining the estimation of background radiation levels as shown in Fig. 5.3 and new measurements
(possibly with injected source data) as shown in Fig. 5.5, one method for source detection is based on point
calculation. Similar to the procedures proposed by Reinhart [88], for the given position r, suppose that
the new measurement is denoted by Xnr , the estimate of background radiation level from Poisson kriging at
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Equation 5.36 gives an anomaly score based on Poisson distribution in the range of [0, 1]. A higher
anomaly score indicates a higher probability of containing information from radioactive sources. To test its
performance in real cases, the experimental data with simulated source data injected as shown in Fig. 5.5
are used. Using this method, the distribution of the calculated anomaly score is shown in Fig. 5.6. Source
detection can be carried out using the Poisson score as defined in Eq. 5.36.
In Fig. 5.6, the Poisson anomaly score is calculated only at the locations where new measurements are
collected in the afternoon. This is because Eq. 5.36 is based on point estimation. Although this method
can identify a collection of suspicious measurements around the injected radioactive sources, it also leads
to many false positives at other locations due to the randomness of Poisson distribution. The ROC curve
based on the results shown in Fig. 5.6 is shown in Fig. 5.7. The AUC is only 0.542, which means it is hard
to confidently locate the radioactive sources.
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Figure 5.6: Poisson anomaly score distribution calculated using Poisson kriging model for background radi-
ation. The injected source is denoted by the red cross inside the circle.


















Figure 5.7: ROC curve for point data based method.
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Distribution-Based Method
To overcome these difficulties, instead of comparing point values, a new anomaly detection technique
based on comparing the new estimation against the original estimation is proposed. Suppose that the
background radiation estimation for position r is denoted by Y br . When new data are collected in the
experimental area, the estimation of current radiation level Y nr can be obtained through Poisson kriging
carried out using the new measurements4. For the data shown in Fig. 5.5, radiation distribution after the
source is injected is obtained using Poisson kriging model, and the result is shown in Fig. 5.8.
Figure 5.8: Poisson kriging estimation with synthetic source injection. The injected source is denoted by
the red cross inside the circle.
In Fig. 5.8, compared with Fig. 5.3, the radiation level is clearly higher in the region surrounding the
injected source. Thus, the difference between the new estimation Y nr and the estimation of background
radiation estimation Y br can be used to define an anomaly score:
Score(Y nr ;Y
b
r ) = Y
n
r − Y br . (5.37)
4In the cases that do not have enough measurements to build new semi-variogram model, the original semi-variogram model
built using the background radiation measurements can be used.
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Equation 5.37 simply compares the value of the new estimation with the estimation of background
radiation level. It works when the background radiation distribution is relatively smooth. However, high
background and low background radiation regions always exist, and due to the existence of high background
radiation regions, the radioactive source cannot be easily detected. In fact, one of the spots in Fig. 5.8 with
high background radiation shows a higher level of radiation than the region at the source.
SNR-Based Method
A more robust definition of anomaly score can be introduced by normalizing the score calculated in
Eq. 5.37 by the background noise level. Using the square root of the estimated background radiation level
as the estimation of noise level and the difference between new estimation and background radiation level




Y nr − Y br√
Y br
. (5.38)
The anomalous source detection process corresponding to Eq. 5.38 is shown in Fig. 5.9. Once the mobile
sensor network system is deployed, the background radiation measurements are available and the estimation
of background radiation levels is obtained from Poisson kriging. After new measurements are collected, the
new estimation of radiation distribution is obtained and the anomaly score based on SNR, ASSNR(Y
n
r ;Yr),










Figure 5.9: Anomalous source detection flowchart.
Using Eq. 5.38, the distribution of SNR-based anomaly score, ASSNR, can be calculated in the studied
5Different from the Poisson anomaly score defined in Eq. 5.36, SNR based anomaly score is no longer bounded within the
range of 0 to 1. There could be values larger than 1 as well as negative values.
6In most cases, the location with the highest anomaly score may not be the exact location of radioactive sources. In more
practical implementations, certain threshold can be set and the regions that are above the given threshold are suspicious and
should be identified for further exploration.
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area, and the results are shown in Fig. 5.10. The actual source location is denoted by the red cross inside
the circle and the estimated source location is denoted by the black triangle, which has the largest SNR.
Clearly, compared with Fig. 5.8, the influence of the high background radiation region is mostly eliminated,










Figure 5.10: SNR-based anomaly score from the Poisson kriging model. Location of the injected source is
denoted by the red cross inside a circle and the estimated source location is denoted by the black triangle.
5.3.2 Error Analysis
The previous section presented the application of Poisson kriging proposed in this chapter for anomalous
source detection, and the results of a sample case where a 100 µCi source is injected 1 meter away from
the walking paths are shown. In addition to the sample case, a comprehensive study of all the cases (source
intensity varies from 100 µCi to 2,000 µCi and the distance to walking paths varies from 1 meter to 10
meters) shows that there are still some cases where the proposed algorithm could not correctly detect the
radioactive sources. A sample case in which a 100 µCi 137Cs source is injected 5 meters away from the


















Figure 5.11: A case where the Poisson kriging model cannot detect correct radioactive source location. The
injected source is denoted by a red cross and the estimated source location is denoted by a black triangle.
In Fig. 5.11, the injected source is denoted by the red cross and the estimated source location identified by
the proposed method is around the statue (denoted by the dark triangle), one of the three locations with high
background radiation level, instead of around the actual source location. One of the major reasons behind this
is that the source intensity is low and the source is relatively far away from the walking path. The radiation
level increase due to injected radioactive source is small. Another reason is that the measured background
radiation data around the statue is higher in the afternoon compared with the measured radiation data in
the morning7. In this way, the estimated radiation level around the statue is higher than the estimation
obtained using the data collected in the morning, which leads to larger SNR-based anomaly score around
the statue. For example, the SNR-based anomaly score at the actual source location is 1.38, while the
anomaly score at the statue is 1.66. These two factors lead to the false positive detection by the proposed
algorithm. If the simulated source is injected into the measured data in the morning, instead of the data in
the afternoon, the proposed algorithm can still correctly locate the radioactive source. Refer to Appendix G
7Since in the morning and in the afternoon, all the conditions are quite similar except temperature, it is assumed that the
high background radiation is partially due to the increase of temperature. For example, the higher temperature may cause




In the cases shown in Fig. 5.11, although the proposed method could not correctly locate the radioactive
sources based on maximal SNR-based anomaly score, further study shows that the proposed method could
still correctly identify the local hot-spots around the actual source location. For example, the proposed
algorithm identifies 7 locations that have relatively larger anomaly scores. Ordered by the anomaly score
in decreasing order, the top 7 potential locations are denoted by numbers from 1 to 7 on the figure, and
the exact locations and corresponding SNRs are listed in Table 5.1. The largest SNR-based anomaly score
happens around the statue (location 1), while the second largest SNR-based anomaly score is around the
actual radioactive source (location 2). This kind of local hot-spot information is useful for restricting the
suspicious region to smaller regions for further exploration.
Table 5.1: Top 7 Potential Radioactive Source Positions
No. x (m) y (m) SNR
1 78.0 23.0 1.6574
2 452 173.0 1.3897
3 352.0 49.0 1.3596
4 56.0 201.0 1.2674
5 206.0 267.0 1.2293
6 92.0 205.0 1.2203
7 52.0 261.0 1.1944
In addition to missing the source as is the case shown in Fig. 5.11, another concern is the likelihood of
the proposed method to predict false positives, most likely at high background regions. Figure 5.12 shows
the results of the proposed methods for the measured data without any synthetic source being injected. The
global hot-spot is denoted by the black triangle, which has the largest SNR-based anomaly score, and it is
within the high background radiation region.
As a comparison, Fig. 5.13 shows the result of the same method on the data with a 100 µCi synthetic
source injected 1 meter away from the walking path within the high background region. Figure 5.12 and
Fig. 5.13 both identify the source to be within the high background region. However, compared with Fig. 5.12,
in Fig. 5.13, the SNR-based anomaly score when actual radioactive source does exist is much larger than
the cases without any radioactive source. For example, ASSNR for the hotspot in Fig. 5.12 is 1.65 while it
is 3.51 for the hotspot in Fig. 5.13. Thus, the false positive rate can be reduced by defining the appropriate






















Figure 5.13: Anomaly score with source injected at high background region. The injected source is denoted
by the red cross and the estimated source location is denoted by the black triangle.
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To show the overall performance of the proposed methods for anomalous source detection problems,
Table 5.2, Table 5.3, and Table 5.4 show the source detection accuracy with different distance thresholds8.
The source detection accuracy is calculated according to the given distance threshold. When the distance
of the estimated source location from the actual source location is smaller than the distance threshold, the
source is assumed to be correctly detected.
As expected, the performance of the proposed method is dramatically influenced by source intensity
and the distance of radioactive source from the walking paths. When the source is close enough or the
source intensity is high enough or both, the detection accuracy could reach 100%. However, when the source
intensity is low or the distance of radioactive source from the walking paths is too large, source cannot be
easily detected based on global anomaly score9. But as discussed previously, when the proposed algorithm
cannot correctly detect radioactive sources using the global maximal anomaly score, it can still identify local
hot-spot regions around the radioactive sources as shown in Fig. 5.11.
Table 5.2: Source (137Cs) Detection Accuracy with 5 m Distance Threshold
Configuration
Distance to the Walking Path
1 m 5 m 10 m
Source Intensity
100 µCi (127 cps) 80% 0% 0%
300 µCi (380 cps) 100% 40% 0%
500 µCi (626 cps) 100% 50% 20%
1,000 µCi (1,220 cps) 100% 60% 30%
2,000 µCi (2,354 cps) 100% 70% 30%
8It is worth clarifying the difference between distance threshold and distance to the walking path. Distance to the walking
path is the distance of injected source from the walking path and it has the values of 1 meter, 5 meters and 10 meters. The
distance threshold, on the other hand, is only used to calculate the source detection accuracy. In this work, distance thresholds
are set to be 5 meters, 10 meters, and 20 meters for Table 5.2, Table 5.3, and Table 5.4, respectively.
9There are certain cases, for example, when the 100 µCi source is placed 10 meters away from the walking path, the 0% or
10% source detection accuracy is actually due to the fact that the nearby detectors cannot measure any useful signal. This is
because that the source intensity is too low and the distance is too large. These cases can be totally ignored when evaluating
the performance of the proposed algorithm.
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Table 5.3: Source (137Cs) Detection Accuracy with 10 m Distance Threshold
Configuration
Distance to the Walking Path
1 m 5 m 10 m
Source Intensity
100 µCi (127 cps) 90% 20% 10%
300 µCi (380 cps) 100% 90% 20%
500 µCi (626 cps) 100% 100% 40%
1,000 µCi (1,220 cps) 100% 100% 50%
2,000 µCi (2,354 cps) 100% 100% 60%
Table 5.4: Source (137Cs) Detection Accuracy with 20 m Distance Threshold
Configuration
Distance to the Walking Path
1 m 5 m 10 m
Source Intensity
100 µCi (127 cps) 90% 20% 10%
300 µCi (380 cps) 100% 90% 20%
500 µCi (626 cps) 100% 100% 50%
1,000 µCi (1,220 cps) 100% 100% 90%
2,000 µCi (2,354 cps) 100% 100% 100%
To better illustrate the performance of the proposed method under different source intensities and dis-
tances, additional sample cases are shown in Fig. 5.14. For each row, the source intensities are the same,
but the distances of radioactive source to the walking path increase. For each column, the distances to the
walking path are the same, but the source intensities increase. When source intensity is too low (e.g., 100
µCi) or the source is too far away from the walking path (e.g., 5 meters or 10 meters), the proposed algorithm
cannot correctly detect the radioactive sources. But the performance improves when the source intensity is
increased. For example, considering the third row of second column and third column of Fig. 5.14, as the
source intensity increases to 500 µCi, the proposed algorithm still works even when the radioactive source
is placed 10 meter away from the walking paths.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, Poisson kriging is implemented to model the geospatial count data measured from
mobile sensor networks, which takes the geospatial correlation into account. Based on the estimation,
64
(a) 100µCi source 1 meter away (b) 100µCi source 5 meter away (c) 100µCi source 10 meter away
(d) 300µCi source 1 meter away (e) 300µCi source 5 meter away (f) 300µCi source 10 meter away
(g) 500µCi source 1 meter away (h) 500µCi source 5 meter away (i) 500µCi source 10 meter away
(j) 1000µCi source 1 meter away (k) 1000µCi source 5 meter away (l) 1000µCi source 10 meter away
Figure 5.14: Poisson kriging anomaly detection for selected experiments. Actual radioactive source locations
are denoted by red crosses and estimated source locations are denoted by black triangles.
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anomalous source detection is performed to detect the potential radioactive sources. The performance of
the proposed framework is analyzed using a small mobile sensor network and experimental (measured) data
with simulated radioactive sources injected. The results indicate that the proposed algorithm can find the
anomalous radioactive source with extremely high accuracy if the source is close enough to the walking path
(e.g., 1 meter away from the walking path) or if the radioactive source is strong enough (e.g., 500 µCi or
above). For cases where the radioactive source is placed 5 meters away from the walking paths, the number
of successful cases increases rapidly when the source intensity increases. The model yields poor performance
when the sources studied are more than 10 meters away from the walking paths.
On the other hand, there are several uncertainty factors in this study. The radiation level that is
measured using a mobile sensor is significantly affected by weather condition, detector’s shielding condition,
and moving speed. The correlation between those factors and the background radiation level is not analyzed
in this work. Also, the current Poisson kriging model assumes that the background radiation level has the
same mean value among the region of interest. A more advanced hierarchical model [84] can also be used
to avoid the uniform mean assumptions. In addition, the proposed algorithm is only tested using a small
mobile sensor network for weak radioactive sources. In practical applications, the computational complexity
should be considered and the optimal threshold for anomalous source detection should be determined using
much larger experimental data.
Poisson kriging is useful for estimating nuclear radiation levels given measurements available at only parts
of the studied area. It can also be used to identify smaller regions that may contain radioactive sources.
But its performance on accurately locating the radioactive sources are limited by many factors. In the next
chapter, a source localization technique based on maximum likelihood estimation is proposed, which provides
more accurate results for source localization.
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Chapter 6
Parameter Estimation for Anomalous
Source Localization
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 introduced Poisson kriging to estimate background radiation levels and detect anomalous
source. Considering the geospatial correlation between radiation measurements, Poisson kriging can correctly
estimate background radiation levels using measured radiation data from nearby locations and reach fairly
high accuracy in detecting radioactive sources when the source intensities are high or the radioactive sources
are close to the detectors. Poisson kriging is more useful in determining the existence of radioactive sources
than accurately locating radioactive sources. For source localization, other methods are needed.
Using the results from Poisson anomaly score as described in section 4.2 or Poisson kriging model from
Chapter 5, the existence of potential radioactive sources can be determined, and further search can be
restricted to smaller regions, instead of the entire studied area. This chapter focuses on radioactive source
localization and estimation problems. Without relying on active search, kernel density estimation (KDE)
and grid search are implemented respectively with maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) on the streaming
data to estimate the source location and intensity. The scenarios for stationary sources are discussed in
detail. The performance of the proposed algorithms is compared and demonstrated using a simulation study
and a small-scale experiment with simulated radioactive sources injected.
6.2 Background and Theory
6.2.1 Parameter Estimation for Source Localization
As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, the measured count rate by a detector is assumed to follow
the Poisson distribution. The probability that a detector collects m counts in a unit time with expectation
λ is:





Suppose that some radioactive source with source intensity s0 is placed at location r0, where r0 =
(x0, y0) ∈ R2, and the i-th detector is placed at position ri = (xi, yi). The distance of the i-th detector to
the radioactive source is di = ||ri−r0|| =
√
(xi − x0)2 + (yi − y0)2. Then the average count rate at distance
di should be:


















is due to the attenuation effect, and bi
is the average background radiation count rate at position ri, which are influenced by many factors, such as
location and weather condition.
In the above equation, there is assumed to be only one stationary radioactive source which is isotropic,
and the radiation signals from background and radioactive sources are independent. In addition, all detectors
are assumed to have the same properties, such as detector efficiency and detector face area. Since the size of
the detector and radioactive source are very small compared with the distance between radioactive source and
detector, both detector and source are considered as points. Under the above assumptions, the probability
of a detector at position ri collecting mi count rate is:





Considering the case where N mobile detectors are deployed in the studied area, the positions of all
detectors at time t are denoted by r1, r2, · · · , rN , and the measured gross count rates for each detector are
denoted by m1,m2, · · · ,mN . Since in real cases it is almost impossible to know the influence of attenuation
for all detectors, the influence of attenuation in Eq. 6.2 is ignored. Suppose that for each potential radioactive
source, only a relatively small region (for example, 40 m × 40 m square region in this work) is considered
for source localization. Then it is reasonable to assume that the expected background radiation bi is nearly
constant over the considered area over a short time period, which is denoted by b0. The likelihood function
under the above assumptions is:
L(s0, r0, b0) =
N∏
i=1









1See Table 2.1 for more details about linear attenuation coefficient.
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And the log-likelihood function can be easily derived:
`(s0, r0, b0) =
N∑
i=1















Equation 6.5 is a function of source intensity s0, source position r0, and average background radiation
level b0. Since the estimation of parameters (s0, r0, b0) cannot be directly computed using standard MLE
method due to multiple local maxima, grid search is needed to find the best combination of s0, r0, and b0
such that Eq. 6.5 is maximized [68,90].
Grid search over s0, r0, and b0 is computationally expensive, especially when the region to be searched is
large or there are many discrete positions to be searched. It can be shown that2, for a given source position
r0, the profile log-likelihood function `r0(s0, b0) is concave in s0 and b0. Based on this, once the position
of the radioactive source can be determined, the source intensity can be easily calculated through standard
MLE. This optimization problem can be solved through kernel density estimation with maximum likelihood
estimation or grid search with maximum likelihood estimation. The following sections will illustrate this
idea more precisely3.
6.2.2 Kernel Density Estimation with Maximum Likelihood Estimation
As discussed in Section 6.2.1, locating the radioactive source and estimating the source intensity can be
separated into two steps. The first step is to estimate the location of radioactive source. In this section,
kernel density estimation (KDE) is proposed to estimate the location of radioactive sources. Then, standard
MLE is applied to estimate source intensities.
As described in section 2.5, the idea behind KDE is to estimate the probability density based on given
data using a kernel K(ri, r), where ri is the location of the i-th detector and r is the location to be estimated.
Here, KDE is implemented in 2D instead of 1D. Based on detector positions r1, r2, · · · , rN and count rate
measurements m1,m2, · · · ,mN , for any given position r, the estimated probability density is:
2See reference [68] or Appendix H for detailed proof.
3It might be necessary to point out the difference between this work and the work from Liu et al. [39]. In their implementation,
they mainly used method based on MLE to model the background radiation. The spatial and temporal factors were treated
as two independent Poisson random variables. There was no explicit consideration of radioactive sources in their model. But
in this work, the spatial variation is ignored. Instead, this work treats radiation from background radiation and radioactive
sources as two independent variables and tries to locate the radioactive source and estimate source strength through iterative








where C is the normalizing constant such that
∑
r f̂(r) = 1, and K(ri, r) is the kernel function. In this






with bandwidth σ is used.
The estimated density f̂(r) is assumed to represent the likelihood of radioactive source. Then, the
position with the highest density, r̂ = arg max
r
f̂(r), is the most likely source location based on KDE. After
determining the most likely source location, source intensity can be calculated using standard MLE method,
which is essentially maximizing the profile log-likelihood function `r0(s0, b0) given the source location r0.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 6.1. Section 2.7 introduced gradient ascent and Newton-Raphson methods
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of KDE with MLE for source localization and strength estimation.
6.2.3 Grid Search with Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Section 6.2.2 proposed the application of KDE with MLE for source localization and strength estimation.
In addition to estimating source location using KDE, a more straightforward solution is to calculate the source
intensity s0 and background radiation b0 that maximize the profile log-likelihood function `r0(s0, b0) at all
possible source locations4 r0. Then the location that has the highest likelihood value will be the most likely
source location. This leads to the grid search with MLE method.
The process of grid search with MLE is illustrated in Fig. 6.2. After the suspicious region is identified,
the entire region will be divided into small grids. Then, each node r0 is assumed to be the location of
4In cases when the background radiation can be estimated in advance, only the source intensity s0 that maximizes the
likelihood function is needed, which can simplify the calculation.
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radioactive sources s0. The profile log-likelihood function `r0(s0, b0) is calculated and source intensity s0
and background radiation level b0 that maximize `r0(s0, b0) is determined. This process is repeated for every
node5. Finally, the location with the highest likelihood, r̂0 = arg max
r0
`(s0, r0, b0), is the most likely source
location based on grid search.
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of grid search with MLE for source localization and strength estimation.
6.2.4 Implementation
The implementations of KDE with MLE and grid search with MLE for source localization and estimation
are quite similar with each other. A flowchart of this process is shown in Fig. 6.3.
In practical cases, the calculations are assumed to begin at time t when there are signs that some potential
radioactive sources exist and the suspicious region that may contain radioactive sources is identified. For
example, k-sigma method [6] or Poisson kriging model can be applied first to determine the existence of
radioactive sources. After this step, the system will continue collecting data in the identified region and
KDE with MLE or grid search with MLE can be applied to locate the radioactive sources. Both procedures
can be applied continuously as new measurements within the identified region are collected by detectors.
The is referred as the calculation steps. With limited number of mobile detectors, especially when number
of detectors is small or the entire region to be monitored is large, for each time t, there might be no
measurements collected within the identified suspicious region. In this case, there is no need to repeat the
calculation since there is no information updated. In this way, after one calculation step, several seconds
might pass in actual time before the next calculation step is carried out.
5The size of the grids will influence the source localization precision. When the gird size is too large, the algorithm may
miss the exact location and give large source location error. When the grid size is too small, the precision can be high, but it
will take more computation since the same process needs to be repeated on each node.
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Theoretically, the calculation can be stopped when there is no significant change in the estimated source
positions. As will be seen later, this usually takes a large number of calculation steps to converge, especially
when the number of detectors is small. In real cases, as the calculation continues and the potential sources
are approximately identified, security officers who carry more sensitive detectors can be sent to the suspicious













Figure 6.3: Flowchart of KDE with MLE and Grid Search with MLE.
6.3 Results and Discussion
In this work, only stationary radioactive sources are considered, in which the radioactive source is assumed
to stay at some position for a relatively long period of time such that the mobile detectors can continuously
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collect data from the region surrounding the radioactive source. To test the proposed source localization
and estimation methods, the simulated data and experimental data as described in Chapter 3 are used. The
performance of KDE with MLE and grid search with MLE is presented and compared.
6.3.1 Simulation Results
In the simulation, the scenario where 50 mobile D3S detectors move in the city is simulated, which is
depicted in Fig. 6.4. The simulated map and parameter settings are the same as described in section 3.3. In
the simulation, multiple stationary sources are randomly distributed with or without shielding. Four typical







Figure 6.4: Illustration of simulated city map.
Results: KDE with MLE Approach
The goal of KDE is to estimate the probability density in the selected region to locate the radioactive
source. As time goes on, more measurements will be collected in the study area. The peak region of KDE
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tends to be closer to the actual source location.
To better illustrate the process, a sample case where the radioactive source is located at position 2 in
Fig. 6.4 is chosen. Assuming that after anomaly detection, the region surrounding position 2 is suspected
to contain radioactive source, and a square region (40 m × 40 m) is selected for further analysis. Using the





Figure 6.5: Results of KDE approach with bandwidth 5 m when the source is placed at the intersection
of the roads (scenario with source number 2 in Fig. 6.4). The actual source location is denoted by the red
triangle while the peak location of probability density is denoted by the dark cross.
Figure 6.5 shows the results for the first 200 calculation steps for the sample case using Gaussian kernel
with bandwidth of 5 meters. Calculation steps are given on the top of each figure, while the actual simulation
time in seconds is included in the parentheses. Since in some time steps, no detector enters the selected
suspicious region and hence there is no change in the configuration to be studied. Hence, calculations are
not carried out for those time steps. Therefore, the actual simulation time is much larger than calculation
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steps. The location of the injected radioactive source is denoted by the red triangle, and estimated source
location is denoted by the dark cross, which has the largest probability density calculated using the KDE
approach. The background color represents the calculated probability density from the KDE approach. It
is normalized to have the largest value of 1 and smallest value of 0. Clearly, as time increases, with more
data being collected, the estimated source location gets closer to the actual source location. But KDE with
MLE approach cannot find the exact location of the radioactive source even after 200 calculation steps.
To quantify the overall performance of KDE with MLE, Fig. 6.6 shows the relation of the estimated
source location error versus calculation steps. The source location error is calculated using the Euclidean
distance between the estimated source location and the actual source position. The errors are calculated
for all simulated cases corresponding to to four different source positions depicted in Fig. 6.46. The average
source localization error and corresponding standard error of four different Gaussian kernel bandwidths (5 m,
10 m, 15 m, and 20 m) are shown in the figure.
Figure 6.6: Change of estimated source location error with different Gaussian kernel bandwidths (σ in






). Results are averaged for 4 typical scenarios depicted in Fig. 6.4.
In Fig. 6.6, in all cases, the source localization error gradually decreases as the calculation steps increase
6Figure 6.4 only includes four typical source locations. In the actual simulation, there are more than 10 different source
locations simulated for each typical location from 1 through 4.
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with some fluctuation at the start of the process. Increasing the bandwidth from 5 meters to 10 meters can
dramatically reduce the source localization error. But as the bandwidth keeps increasing, after 15 meters,
there is little improvement. After 400 calculation steps, KDE with bandwidth of 20 meters can reduce the
source localization error to be around 5 meters.
Results: Grid Search with MLE Approach
With KDE approach, although the source localization error can be reduced to be around 5 meters,
this takes around 400 calculation steps, which takes about 1, 000 seconds in simulation time under current
configuration (36 city blocks with 50 mobile detectors). To further reduce the source localization errors with
fewer calculation steps, grid search with MLE is applied. Similar to Fig. 6.5, the results of a sample case for
scenario corresponding to source number 2 in Fig. 6.4 for the first 90 calculation steps are shown in Fig. 6.7.
In the figure, background color corresponds to the calculated likelihood value from grid search with MLE
approach. The color is normalized to be within the range of [0, 1]. The location with the highest likelihood






Figure 6.7: Results of the grid search with MLE when source is placed at the intersection of roads (scenario
with source number 2 in Fig. 6.4). The background color corresponds to the normalized likelihood value
(scaled to be between 0 and 1). The actual source location is denoted by red triangle while the peak location
of normalized likelihood value is denoted by dark cross.
It is obvious that for the same sample case, grid search with MLE approach performs much better
compared with the KDE approach. The estimated source location is almost identical (within 1 m source
localization error) to the actual source location after 20 calculation steps (30 seconds in simulation time).
To show the overall performance under different cases, the averaged source localization error of grid search
for four sources is shown in Fig. 6.8. For comparison, Fig. 6.8 also includes the results of the KDE approach
with bandwidth equals 10 meters using dotted line.
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Figure 6.8: Change of estimated source location error as a function of steps for KDE with MLE approach
and grid search with MLE approach. Results are averaged for 4 source scenarios depicted in Fig. 6.4.
As shown clearly in Fig. 6.8, in the simulation study, the grid search method outperforms the KDE
method by reducing the source localization error as well as decreasing the calculation steps. Grid search
with MLE approach can reduce the source location error to be within 5 meters in about 30 calculation steps,
while KDE will take more than 400 calculation steps. After 100 calculation steps, grid search with MLE
approach can reduce the source localization error to be around 2 meters, while KDE can only reduce it to
be around 7 meters.
In addition to source localization error, another metric is the source intensity estimation error. Figure 6.9
plots the percentage of estimated source intensity error as the calculation step increases. After 100 calculation
steps, the grid search with MLE approach can reduce the source intensity estimation error to be within 10%,
while KDE with MLE approach has much larger estimation error (around 60%).
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Figure 6.9: Change of source strength estimation error with KDE approach and grid search approach.
Results are averaged for 4 typical scenarios depicted in Fig. 6.4.
Although grid search with MLE approach works well for estimating the source intensity, it is worth
mentioning that this is due to the fact that in the simulation, the attenuation effect is quite low and
the simplified model can still model the radiation transport process without a large error. In real cases,
however, considering the existence of buildings, the simplification made for the radiation transport model in
section 6.2.1 will dramatically influence the proposed method’s performance. To reduce the estimation error,
more accurate physical models, especially the model considering the shielding effect around the source, need
to be applied.
6.3.2 Results for Sources Injected in Measured Background Radiation Data
Simulation results for KDE and grid search approaches were presented in the previous sections. To better
quantify the performance, the proposed methods are then applied to the experimental (measured) data with
injected (simulated) sources as described in Section 3.4. During the experiment, the simulated radioactive
sources with source intensity ranging from 100 µCi to 2, 000 µCi are placed at 10 different positions (shown
in Fig. 3.6). The distance from the sources to walking paths is varied from 1 meter to 10 meters. Following
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the steps described in the previous sections, the average source localization errors7 for KDE approach and
grid search approach after 80 calculation steps are shown in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2.
Table 6.1: Average Source (137Cs) Localization Error for KDE Approach
Configuration
Distance to the Walking Path
1 m 5 m 10 m
Source Intensity
100 µCi (127 cps) 9.72 m 10.73 m 13.77 m
300 µCi (380 cps) 9.63 m 10.68 m 13.77 m
500 µCi (626 cps) 9.50 m 10.68 m 13.77 m
1,000 µCi (1,220 cps) 9.41 m 10.63 m 13.77 m
2,000 µCi (2,354 cps) 9.37 m 10.59 m 13.68 m
Table 6.2: Average Source (137Cs) Localization Error for Grid Search Approach
Configuration
Distance to the Walking Path
1 m 5 m 10 m
Source Intensity
100 µCi (127 cps) 2.27 m 7.53 m 17.31 m
300 µCi (380 cps) 0.76 m 4.03 m 16.76 m
500 µCi (626 cps) 0.62 m 2.22 m 10.10 m
1,000 µCi (1,220 cps) 0.50 m 1.76 m 3.99 m
2,000 µCi (2,354 cps) 0.52 m 0.62 m 2.05 m
Compared with the simulation results shown in Fig. 6.8 (for the simulated background radiation case),
KDE approach performs much worse for the measured background radiation data. The main reason is that,
during the experiment, the distance of mobile detectors to the injected radioactive source is limited to be
more than 1 meter, 5 meters, or even 10 meters, and the spatial distribution of those measurements are
not symmetric for the injected source. These factors will bias the peak of KDE toward one single direction,
instead of centering around the injected source, which leads to the worse performance of KDE compared
with the simulated data case.
Grid search approach, on the other hand, performs consistently well for the experiment. It can reduce the
source localization error to be within 2.5 meters when 100 µCi radioactive source is injected 1 meter from
7There are certain cases, for example, when the 100 µCi source is placed 10 meters away from the walking path, the source
localization error is very high and it is actually due to the fact that the nearby detectors cannot measure any useful signal. This
is because that the source intensity is too low and the distance is too large. These cases can be totally ignored when evaluating
the performance of the proposed algorithm for source localization.
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the walking path within 80 calculation steps. When the source is injected 5 meters away, it can reduce the
source localization error from 7.53 m to 2.22 m when source intensity is increased from 100 µCi to 500 µCi.
For the most difficult case where radioactive source is injected 10 meters away, grid search with MLE can
still correctly identify the radioactive sources with gradually decreasing source localization errors (decreases
from 17.3 m to 2.05 m). This shows the robust performance of grid search with MLE approach.
6.4 Summary
The results of anomaly detection or background radiation estimation are used to identify the potential
region that might contain radioactive sources. To pinpoint the radioactive sources, in this chapter, KDE
and grid search approaches are implemented with MLE to locate the radioactive sources. Results from
simulation study and experiment with simulated sources injected in measured background data quantify the
performance of the proposed methods. For stationary sources, grid search with MLE can reduce the source
localization error to around 2 meters for 500 µCi source placed 5 meters away from walking path.
Although the KDE approach is worse than the grid search approach, it is much easier to implement
and faster to calculate compared with the grid search approach, which make it a good choice to estimate
prior information about the potential locations of the radioactive source. Grid search can then be performed
based on the results from the KDE approach, which can reduce the space to explore and thus reduce the
computational need. In addition, multi-resolution grid computation [91] and adaptive grid search [8] have
been proposed to reduce the calculation during grid search, which can also speed up the calculation process.
Additionally, the approaches proposed in this chapter are not restricted to cases where radioactive sources
are stationary, Appendix J includes some preliminary analysis of the proposed techniques for mobile radioac-
tive sources. Also, the grid search with MLE approach is closely related to Bayesian estimation, Appendix K






Previous chapters systematically studied the application of mobile sensor network for nuclear radiation
detection. Simulations and experiments, mobile sensor network systematic assessment, Poisson kriging, and
source localization techniques are discussed in detail. In those analyses, only radiation count rate information
is used. Radiation spectra, which contain additional information about nuclear radiation, can also be used
for nuclear radiation detection. In this chapter, the spectral information is utilized for anomaly detection.
As shown in Fig. 2.3, radiation spectra are simply the histograms of radiation counts binned by channels
or energies. All information from background radiation and radioactive sources are contained in the spectra.
Radiation detectors have a certain number of channels. For example, the D3S detector has 512 channels
while the Ortec 905 NaI detector has 1,024 channels by default. Spectra of randomly sampled 500 spectra
simulated using GADRAS for Ortec 905 detector are shown in Fig. 7.1.
(10	keV) (862	keV) (1759	keV) (2657	keV) (3556	keV)
Figure 7.1: Sample spectra with 1024 channels for Ortec 905 NaI detector. The corresponding energies
are shown in parentheses. White dots indicate non-zero counts at corresponding channels and black dots
indicate zero count.
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The spectra in Fig. 7.1 are sampled from the data simulated using GADRAS. The entire simulated
dataset contains spectra from background radiation and isotopes1 such as 137Cs (500 µCi), 60Co (600 µCi),
and 54Mn (750 µCi). In the figure, each row represents one spectrum with 1,024 channels, and there are
500 spectra in total. White dots indicate non-zero counts at corresponding channels and black dots indicate
zero count at corresponding channels for a given spectrum. It is clear that most records exist in the first
several hundred channels and there are few records when the channel number is too large (for example,
when channel number is larger than 512). This means that for the most commonly used isotopes, high
channel numbers contain little information, and thus they are less useful for anomaly detection. Too many
features also increase the problem complexity due to the curse of dimensionality [15]. In this chapter, only
the information from the first 512 channels for Ortec 905 detectors are used.
As mentioned in section 1.3.1, nuclear radiation detection is essentially an anomaly detection problem.
The goal of anomaly detection is to distinguish the anomalous measurements from the normal background
measurements. Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 presented several approaches based on radiation count rate data.
Using count rate data, since it is only a scalar value, anomaly detection is mostly based on comparing the
measured data with some baseline or estimation. However, using spectral information, there are many more
possible approaches to address this problem.
This chapter presents the exploratory study of spectrum-based anomaly detection for nuclear radiation
data. More specifically, this chapter focuses on two types of spectrum-based anomaly detection problems:
unsupervised and semi-supervised anomaly detection2. Dimensionality reduction, regression models, and
proximity-based models are discussed. The performance of these methods is evaluated using simulated
radiation data.
7.2 Dimensionality Reduction and Reconstruction
As discussed in Section 7.1, even after removing the information from less useful channels, there are still
512 channels left. For the purpose of radiation detection using radiation spectra, information from each
channel is considered to be a dimension in the problem. The large amount of dimensionality makes it hard
to analyze and visualize the data. However, not all dimensions are equally useful for anomaly detection.
It is expected that some dimensions help little when performing anomaly detection. This section focuses
on the application of dimensionality reduction for anomaly detection. Two typical dimensionality reduction
1For the spectra with isotopes, the whole dataset includes the simulation at different distances, ranging from 0.5 m to 20 m.
2For unsupervised anomaly detection, there are no labels for the data. The model should be able to distinguish abnormal
measurements based on unlabeled data. For semi-supervised anomaly detection, a small part of the data have labels while
others are not labeled, or only normal data are labeled (as the focus of this chapter). For more detailed explanation and
description, see Reference [16].
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techniques, principal component analysis (PCA) and autoencoder, are explored.
7.2.1 Principal Component Analysis
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a widely used method for feature generation and dimensionality
reduction. Suppose that there are n spectra, and each spectrum has m dimensions. The i-th spectrum is
denoted by vector xTi (xi is a column vector with 512 dimensions in this work). These n spectra can be
represented by a data matrix X with n rows and m columns:
X =

· · · xT1 · · ·




· · · xTn · · ·

. (7.1)
X contains large amount of spectral information from normal background radiation. The first step of
the PCA is to compute the mean values µ = (µ1, µ2, · · · , µm) for each dimension, which correspond to
the average background radiation at each channel. Then, for the given data matrix X, by subtracting the
mean values in each dimension, all dimensions are made to have a zero-mean, which leads to the centered
data matrix Xc. Next, by calculating the covariance matrix of centered data matrix Xc and singular value
decomposition (SVD), a series of orthonormal eigenvectors, or principal components, v1,v2, · · · ,vm, can
be extracted from the input data Xc. All principal components are sorted according to the corresponding
variance (eigenvalue) explained by each principal component, which is denoted by λ1, λ2, · · · . Hence, the
first principal component explains the largest variance. The second principal component is orthogonal to
the first one and explains the second largest variance, and so on.
The above process is shown in Fig. 7.2 using a 2D sample dataset. The original data is plotted over
X-axis and Y-axis. Abnormal measurement A is within the normal range for both X-axis and Y-axis, which
makes it hard to classify point A as outlier only based on the measured values along these two axes. On
the other hand, the original data can be better represented over new axes denoted by red arrows, which
correspond to the two principal component directions calculated using the PCA. If the original data are
projected onto the two principal component directions, variance on the first principal component direction
is much larger than on the second principal component direction. For dimensionality reduction purpose, the
original data can be represented using only the projection value on the first principal component direction
with minimal information loss.
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A
(a) 2D sample data.
A
(b) Projection on first two principal component directions.
Figure 7.2: Illustration of PCA on 2D sample data. Sample abnormal measurement A is denoted by red
dot.
To use the PCA for anomaly detection, one choice is to use the first k principal components to reconstruct
the data [8,32]. Given a new measured spectrum, the reconstructed spectrum is assumed to be the estimation
of background radiation for the given spectrum since the PCA model is constructed using background
radiation spectra. The difference between the original data and the reconstructed data is then used as
the anomaly score. The hyperparameter k plays an important role and the optimal k varies with specific
problems. For high-quality spectra, it was suggested that k = 5 is a good empirical choice [8]. In that case,
the first principal component explains around 55% of total variance, and the top 5 principal components
explain around 70% of total variance. However, for low-quality spectra as used in this chapter, it is hard
to choose such a small value of k. Figure 7.3 shows the change of cumulative variance explained by various
number of principal components for the simulated background radiation spectra. Each principal component
only contains little information and the difference among the first several principal components are small,
which is quite different from the well-collected spectra [8]. In Fig. 7.3, the first 64 principal components




Figure 7.3: Cumulative variance explained by various number of principal components.
In addition to choosing the first k principal components to reconstruct the background spectrum, another
choice is by defining a normalized anomaly score consisting of the contribution from all principal components.




|(x− µ) · vi|
λi
, (7.2)
where x represents the new spectrum, λi is the eigenvalue, and the corresponding i-th eigenvector is vi.
In this work, the PCA model is constructed only based on the background information. The intuition
behind the PCA-based anomaly detection is that, when the new spectrum x which contains radioactive
source information is projected onto the principal components space, it tends to have larger deviation on the
eigenvectors that have low variance and smaller deviation on the eigenvectors with high variance. While for
normal background radiation spectrum, it should have smaller deviation on the eigenvectors that have low
variance and larger deviation on the eigenvectors with high variance. Based on this difference, these abnormal
spectra can be distinguished from normal background radiation spectra using anomaly score defined in
Eq. 7.2. For example, as shown in Fig. 7.2, compared with normal measurements, measurement A deviates
much larger in the second principal component direction (PC2) than in the first principal component direction
(PC1) compared with normal measurements. Through PCA, measurement A is more easily identified in the
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new space than in the original feature space if only the measured values in X-axis and Y-axis are used.
7.2.2 Autoencoder
PCA is used to perform dimensionality reduction and anomaly detection. As a linear transformation3,
PCA is easy to implement and understand. However, linear transformation does not work well for more
complex problems. Under such conditions, another technique that is similar to PCA, called autoencoder [70],
can be used to perform non-linear dimensionality reduction and reconstruction.
Autoencoders treat the input x, for example, radiation spectrum in this work, as the target. The goal is
to find a reconstruction function r(x) = g(h(x)) through encoder h(·) and decoder g(·) [93]. An autoencoder
system is usually a multi-layer deep neural network, which can be trained through back-propagation [70].
Figure 7.4 shows the bottleneck structure of a 5 layer autoencoder system. The input data are represented
by input layer. Through the encoder layers, the input data are represented in a lower dimension. The











































Figure 7.4: Structure of a 5-layer Autoencoder system.
For anomaly detection, the autoencoder is trained on the normal background radiation data. After
3There also exists non-linear version of PCA, called kernel PCA. See Ref [92] for more details.
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training, given a new spectrum x, the autoencoder is used to reconstruct the spectrum x̂. The reconstruction
error, which is measured using the Euclidean distance (L2 norm) or Manhattan distance (L1 norm), is used
to define the anomaly score:
ASAE(x) = ||x− x̂|| or |x− x̂|. (7.3)
Intuitively, since the autoencoder system is trained using the normal background radiation data, it tends
to capture the most significant features of the background data. These captured features can be used
to estimate the normal background radiation through reconstruction. When a new background spectrum
is given, due to its similarity to the spectra used to train the model, the autoencoder can successfully
reconstruct the spectrum without large errors. However, when a spectrum that contains radioactive source
information is given, since it has differences from the normal background spectra, the reconstruction error
will be large. To better explain this, PCA and autoencoder are applied to a sample dataset consisting of
different radioactive sources (137Cs, 60Co, and 152Eu). The dataset was measured in laboratory using Ortec
905 detector for 30 seconds, and the results are shown in Fig. 7.5.
Here, the PCA model is implemented using Scikit-learn [94] and autoencoder models4 are implemented
using TensorFlow [95]. Both models are trained using the measured background radiation data. For autoen-
coder, batch size is set to be 512, and early stopping [70] is applied to prevent overfitting. New measurements
that contain radioactive source information are reconstructed using the PCA and the autoencoder models.
These are shown in Fig. 7.5. The original spectra, reconstructed spectra, and the difference (only keeping
the positive values) are shown in different colors. Figures 7.5a, 7.5d, and 7.5g contain source information
from 137Cs, 60Co, and 152Eu. Figures 7.5b, 7.5e, and 7.5h show results from the PCA. First 65 eigenvectors
are used to reconstruct the spectra, which maintain 70% of the total variance. Figures 7.5c, 7.5f, and 7.5i are
reconstructed spectra from autoencoder. The results show that both PCA and autoencoder models could
correctly capture the source information under current configuration with some noise.





























































































































































































































































To show the overall performance of PCA and autoencoder models, PCA and autoencoder are trained and
applied using the simulated data which are modeled based on the Ortec 905 detector5. Using the anomaly
scores defined in Eq. 7.2 and Eq. 7.3, the ROC curves for PCA and autoencoder can be calculated. The
results are shown in Fig. 7.6. The PCA model gives the AUC of 0.83 while the autoencoder gives the AUC
of 0.89. It is clear that autoencoder outperforms PCA model on the simulated data.




















Figure 7.6: ROC curves for PCA and autoencoder systems for anomaly detection.
The structure of the autoencoder system determines its performance for anomaly detection. Two major
factors are the number of layers and the number of nodes at each layer. Table 7.1 lists a series of autoencoder
structures explored in this work. For example, the structure of 512 - 384 - 256 - 384 - 512 means that the
autoencoder has 512 input nodes and 512 output nodes. And there are three hidden layers with 384, 256,
and 384 nodes in each layer. Mean square error (MSE) and mean absolute error (MAE) are chosen as the
loss function. Accordingly, L2 distance and L1 distance are chosen as the metric to define anomaly score.
AUCs for each case are listed in the table. In all the cases, autoencoder with L1 distance metric gives better
results compared with the L2 distance metric. Generally, when the number of layers is fixed, changing the
5For more details about the simulation, see section 3.2.2.
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number of nodes for each layer has little influence on the performance of autoencoder, especially for the
cases with L2 distance metric and when the number of layers is 5 or 7. Increasing the number of layers does
improve the system’s performance, especially for the cases with L1 distance metric and when the number
of layers increases from 5 to 7. However, as the number of layers increases, the model’s complexity also
increases. This will take more iterations to train the model and it is easier to overfit.
Table 7.1: AUC for Different Autoencoder Structures
Number of Layers Autoencoder Structure AUC with L2 AUC with L1
3
512 - 384 - 512 0.85 0.91
512 - 256 - 512 0.85 0.91
512 - 128 - 512 0.86 0.90
512 - 64 - 512 0.90 0.91
5
512 - 384 - 256 - 384 - 512 0.86 0.91
512 - 384 - 128 - 384 - 512 0.89 0.91
512 - 256 - 128 - 256 - 512 0.89 0.91
512 - 256 - 64 - 256 - 512 0.90 0.93
7
512 - 384 - 256 - 128 - 256 - 384 - 512 0.89 0.93
512 - 384 - 256 - 64 - 256 - 384 - 512 0.90 0.94
512 - 256 - 128 - 64 - 128 - 256 - 512 0.90 0.93
512 - 384 - 128 - 64 - 128 - 384 - 512 0.91 0.93
7.3 Regression Modeling
PCA and autoencoder assume that the normal background radiation spectrum can be represented in
a new space with fewer dimensions. Similarly, since each dimension is usually not independent of other
dimensions, another idea is to use the dependency relationship between each dimension to identify the
abnormal measurements. In this section, a linear regression model is implemented for anomaly detection.
7.3.1 Methodology
For radiation spectra, each dimension is not totally independent of other dimensions. Thus, one intuitive
idea is to predict the information in one dimension using the information from other dimensions. In other
words, in regression modeling, for any chosen dimension, it is treated as the dependent variable, and all
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the other dimensions are considered as independent variables. A linear regression model is built and the
deviation of the dependent variable from the predicted value is used to identify abnormal measurements.
Considering the feature vector x with m dimensions (in this chapter, m equals 512), for each dimension




βij · xj + βi0 + εi, (7.4)
where i represents the dependent dimension to be regressed, j represents the independent variable direction,
βij are the coefficients, and εi is the deviation.
The linear regression model is fitted on n instances x(1),x(2), · · · ,x(n) and the coefficient βij are deter-
mined through minimizing the mean square error (MSE). In this way, m different linear models are built
for each dimension from 1 through m. For the new measurement x = (x1, x2, · · · , xm), the m linear models
are applied and deviations ε1, ε2, · · · , εm are calculated. To measure the anomaly score, two commonly used













The above methods assume that the contribution of different dimensions are equally important. In real
cases, some dimensions are more important in determining abnormal measurements while other dimensions
are less important. For example, to determine the existence of 60Co, the counts at channels corresponding
to energies 1.17 MeV and 1.33 MeV are more important than other channels. To incorporate this, in the
so-called attribute-wise leaning for scoring outliers (ALSO) approach, Paulheim and Meusel [96] proposed
weighted score to measure the anomaly score.








where x̄i is the average value for the i-th dimension. Then, the corresponding weight wi for the i-th dimension
is defined as:
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wi = 1−min(1, Ri). (7.8)
Intuitively, the weight wi is 0 if the model performs worse then simply predicting average. Then, this
dimension is assumed to be an irrelevant dimension for anomaly detection [16]. Thus, the outlier score for




wi · ε2i (x). (7.9)
7.3.2 Implementation
When implementing linear regression model for anomaly detection, certain factors need to be considered,
including semi-supervised or unsupervised cases, and to normalize features or not. For semi-supervised
cases, it is assumed that the normal background radiation data are available. Then the linear regression
model is fitted based on the normal measurements and the fitted model is used to make predictions for
new measurements. For unsupervised cases, the linear regression model is fitted based on all available data.
Feature normalization refers to the process of subtracting the mean value from input data and then dividing
the standard deviation for each dimension. Through feature normalization, the transformed input data have
zero-mean and unit variance for each dimension.
In this section, for the radiation data, AUC is calculated using MSE (Eq. 7.5), MAE (Eq. 7.6), and
weighted score (Eq. 7.9) as anomaly score. The results are shown in Table 7.2. The configuration, feature
normalization, and metric have different influences. Compared with MSE, MAE always gives better results.
And in the unsupervised implementation, after feature normalization, weighted score performs much better
than using MSE and MAE. The unsupervised implementation method using MAE as anomaly score and
without feature normalization gives best result among all the configurations.
Table 7.2: Comparison of Anomaly Detection for Linear Regression
Configuration
Semi-Supervised Unsupervised
MSE MAE Weighted Score MSE MAE Weighted Score
No Feature Normalization 0.9104 0.9216 0.8974 0.9065 0.9306 0.8932
Feature Normalization 0.8274 0.9016 0.8510 0.7338 0.8866 0.9289
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7.3.3 Discussion
This section discusses the application of feature-wise linear regression for anomaly detection, and the
results are compared for different configurations. It is worth mentioning that the principles behind the
above models are not limited to using a linear regression model as the base model. Other models, such as
regression trees [97] or even more advanced random forest models, can also be used as the base model, which
might provide more robust performance for anomaly detection.
7.4 Proximity-Based Models
Previous sections discussed the application of PCA, autoencoder, and regression model for anomaly
detection. PCA and linear regression models work well for the cases where all the normal background data
are similar to each other. In other words, in the feature space, these normal background radiation spectra
form one “cluster” as shown in Fig. 7.7a. In the figure6, features x and y represent two general features. The
feature space in practical cases is usually more than two dimensions. For nuclear radiation, feature x and
feature y can be considered as the measured counts at channels corresponds to energies 1.17 MeV and 1.33
MeV, which correspond to the peak energies of 60Co. In this case, the data within the cluster correspond
to normal background radiation data. Outliers such as measurement A can be thought of as the spectrum
containing information from 60Co, thus defined as abnormal measurement.
A
(a) Anomaly detection with one cluster.
B
C
(b) Anomaly detection with three clusters.
Figure 7.7: Illustration of Anomaly Detection. Sample abnormal measurements are denoted by characters
A, B, and C.
6All data are just used to illustrated the idea behind proximity-based method. There is no connection with actual radiation
data.
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In addition to the case shown in Fig. 7.7a, however, there are cases where there might exist multiple
dense clusters. For example, consider the case shown in Fig. 7.7b, in which there are three dense clusters. In
this case, PCA and linear regression models might still work for abnormal measurement B, but they cannot
correctly identify measurement C as abnormal measurement without appropriate feature transformation.
For abnormal measurements like B, methods based on proximity (distance or density) would be appropriate.
In this section, proximity-based anomaly detection techniques are studied. More specifically, distance-based
and density-based methods are discussed.
7.4.1 Distance Metrics
Distance, or dissimilarity, is the metric used to measure the dissimilarity between measurements. In many
cases, especially for proximity-based models, the anomaly detection process finally becomes the process of
measuring the distance between the new measurement and calculated template or other measurements.
Well-defined distance metrics generally have some desired properties, including positivity, symmetry,
and triangle inequality [98]. Suppose x and y are two measurements with m dimensions, and d(x,y) is the
distance between x and y, then the following properties should hold for the distance metric d(·):
1. Positivity
• d(x,y) ≥ 0 for all x and y.
• d(x,y) = 0 only if x = y.
2. Symmetry
d(x,y) = d(y,x) for all x and y.
3. Triangle Inequality
d(x, z) ≤ d(x,y) + d(y, z) for all x, y, and z.
There are several commonly used distance metrics. Expressions for Euclidean distance, Manhattan















(x− y)TS−1(x− y), (7.12)
where S is the covariance matrix.
• Cosine distance
d(x,y) = 1− x · y
||x|| ||y||
. (7.13)
Additionally, Euclidean distance and Manhattan distance are two special cases of Minkowski distance.








In addition to above distances, there are many other distances, such as Hamming distance and Jaccard
dissimilarity. As will be shown later, choosing the correct distance metrics is important and the performance
of anomaly detection can be influenced by the choice of distance metrics.
7.4.2 Distance-Based Anomaly Detection
For distance-based method, the intuitive idea is to compare the distance to its nearest neighbors to identify
the abnormal measurements, which leads to k-nearest neighbors (KNN) method. Considering measurements
A, B, and C in Fig. 7.7, they share one common characteristic: compared with majority of measurements,
they are located in a relatively sparse area in the feature space. In other words, they are far away from their
neighbors.
To formalize the above idea, suppose that there are n normal measurements x(1),x(2), · · · ,x(n), and
the new measurement to be considered is x. Among the existing measurements, without loss of generality,
suppose that the first k closest measurements, or nearest neighbors, are denoted by x(1),x(2), · · · ,x(k). Then
the anomaly score can be defined using the distance to these k measurements. Commonly used anomaly
scores include the distance to the k-th nearest neighbor, average distance to the first k nearest neighbors,
and the Harmonic distance to the first k nearest neighbors [16].
The performance of k-nearest neighbors method is mostly influenced by the number of nearest neighbors
to be used, the definition of distance metric, and the definition of anomaly score. Simulation study shows
that using the definition of average distance to the k nearest neighbors and the Harmonic distance to the
k nearest neighbors have very similar results, which are both better than using the distance to the k-th
nearest neighbor. To show the influence of number of neighbors on the performance of KNN method, the
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Manhattan distance (L1 norm) and Euclidean distance (L2 norm) are implemented, and the anomaly score
is calculated using the average distance to the k nearest neighbors. The results are shown in Fig. 7.8.
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(a) KNN with Manhattan distance (L1).
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(b) KNN with Euclidean distance (L2).
Figure 7.8: Comparison of KNN with L1 and L2 distances for different number of nearest neighbors.
In Fig. 7.8, using 49 neighbors, the AUC when using Manhattan distance can reach 0.9348, while for
Euclidean distance, with 11 neighbors, the AUC is 0.9276. In addition, Fig. 7.8 clearly shows that Manhattan
distance (L1) are less sensitive to number of neighbors than Euclidean distance (L2) when the number of
nearest neighbors is large enough. This is due to the fact that Manhattan distance is less sensitive to outliers,
which makes it a more robust method for anomaly detection.
Rectified Distance
Choosing the appropriate distance metric is the key to KNN method. For different problems, some
domain-specific distances or pseudo-distances can be defined to improve the performance of anomaly detec-
tion systems. Here, considering the properties of radiation spectrum, the so-called rectified distances are
proposed in this work for semi-supervised anomaly detection based on traditional Euclidean distance and
Manhattan distance:




(max(xi − yi, 0))2 (7.15)




max(xi − yi, 0), (7.16)
where x is the new measurement, y is the normal measurements (for example, normal background
radiation spectrum) from the training dataset.
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Essentially, for semi-supervised anomaly detection, if the new measurement has smaller value for some
dimensions compared with the normal measurements, in rectified distance, these dimension are not impor-
tant at all. Clearly, the definition of rectified distance does not follow the three properties described in
section 7.4.1. But this does not influence the practical implementation of rectified distances.
In the comparison experiment, it is found that using the rectified Euclidean distance, AUC is increased
from 0.927 to 0.936, while for rectified Manhattan distance, AUC is increased from 0.934 to 0.940. Though
the impact is small, both suggest that the rectified distances are slightly better choices.
7.4.3 Density-Based Anomaly Detection
K-nearest neighbors method is based on comparing the distance to its nearest neighbors. It works well
when different clusters have similar densities (as shown in Fig. 7.7b). However, when the density difference
among different clusters is large, the performance of k-nearest neighbors method is significantly influenced.
Figure 7.9 shows a sample case where there are two clusters with different densities7. For this case, KNN
method can easily identify points like B as abnormal measurements since it is far away from its neighbors,
but it might fail to identify point A as an abnormal measurement since it is close to a dense cluster.
A
B
Figure 7.9: Illustration of Anomaly Detection. Two sample abnormal measurements are denoted by letters
A and B.
7All data are just used to illustrated the idea behind density-based method. There is no connection with actual radiation
data.
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To address this challenge, the measurement of local density is used for anomaly detection. Methods such
as local outlier factor (LOF) [99] have been developed. For the radiation data used in this chapter, LOF has
similar performance as KNN method on the simulated data.
7.4.4 Discussion
Although distance-based and density-based methods work for both semi-supervised and unsupervised
cases, in practical implementation, the computational complexity needs to be considered and unsupervised
implementation is not suggested. Appendix M includes the analysis on time complexity of KNN method. As
shown in Fig. M.2, as the sample size increases, the query time increases linearly. For unsupervised cases,
the test size is usually much larger compared with the training set in semi-supervised implementation, which
will dramatically increase the query time.
For the high dimension problems, due to the curse of dimensionality, the distances between measurements
tend to increase and it is more difficult to find “close” neighbors to make predictions. However, the distance-
based and density-based methods actually work for radiation spectrum regardless of high dimensionality
problems. The possible reason is that although the spectrum has 512 dimensions, most useful information
is concentrated in the first 100 to 200 dimensions, which is clearly shown in Fig. 7.1. Thus, the actual
dimensionality of the problem is much smaller, which makes the anomaly detection techniques based on
distance or density still applicable for nuclear radiation spectra.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, several commonly used anomaly detection techniques are discussed in detail. Simula-
tion data are used to quantify and compare the performance of different algorithms. Table 7.3 lists the
performance of studied algorithms for spectrum-based anomaly detection.
Table 7.3: Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) of Different Anomaly Detection Techniques
Method Semi-supervised Implementation Unsupervised Implementation
PCA 0.831 N.A.
Autoencoder 0.936 N.A.
Linear Regression 0.922 0.931
KNN 0.940 N.A.
For the most simple method, the PCA method, although its performance (AUC 0.831) is poor compared
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with other methods, it is easy and fast to build the model and make predictions. For the autoencoder
system, its performance (AUC 0.936) is much better compared with the PCA method and it is also fast to
make predictions, but it is harder to train the model, especially when the model is too complex. For the
linear regression model, the unsupervised implementation (AUC 0.931) gives better performance than the
semi-supervised implementation (AUC 0.922). For the KNN method, it is very easy to understand and gives
the highest AUC (0.940) among these methods. However, as a lazy method, the KNN method may take
longer computational time to make predictions, especially when the training dataset is too large. In addition
to the methods discussed in this chapter, other methods, such as one-class support vector machine (SVM),
methods based on clustering analysis, as well as ensemble methods such as isolation forest [100, 101], can
also be applied.
As one important step after data collection, anomaly detection provides important prior information for
source localization and isotope identification. Accurately identifying abnormal measurements can reduce
the computation resources, restrict the searching region for source localization, and simplify the isotope
identification tasks8.
8A preliminary discussion of potential usage of anomaly detection for isotope identification is included in Appendix N.
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Chapter 8
Summary and Future Work
8.1 Summary
Nuclear radiation detection plays an important role in public health and national security. Nuclear
radiation detection process consists of data collection, anomaly detection, and source localization procedures.
After nuclear radiation data are collected, anomaly detection can be first applied and abnormal measurements
are identified. Through anomaly detection, the volume of data to be further processed is dramatically
reduced and suspicious regions that might contain radioactive sources are identified. Then, source localization
techniques would be applied to pinpoint the radioactive sources based on the result from anomaly detection.
This work studied the application of mobile sensor networks for nuclear radiation detection in detail.
More specifically, in this work, a mobile sensor network simulation system based on GADRAS was
first developed. The simulation system could simulate multiple mobile detectors in a simplified urban
environment. GADRAS simulated data made the simulation more realistic and the simulated data were not
restricted to count rate data anymore. The simulation system provided the foundation for this project. In
addition to simulations, a small mobile sensor network system was also built with D3S detectors and the
simulated data injected in measured background radiation data were obtained to test the performance of
proposed algorithms in near-real environment.
A systematic analysis on the performance of mobile sensor networks was performed based on simulations.
Using the radiation count rate data, the influence of anomaly detection algorithms, detector characteristics,
and number of detectors were analyzed in terms of anomaly detection, SNR and so on. These analyses would
be helpful for the actual deployment of mobile sensor networks in cities.
For anomaly detection, when background radiation levels were easy to obtain, the traditional k-sigma
method was the first choice. It was efficient and easy to implement. When background radiation levels were
not available, inspired by geospatial analysis, this work proposed the Poisson kriging model for radiation
count data. The geospatial correlation between radiation measurements was explicitly considered and the
radiation levels were estimated at unknown locations using available measurements. An anomalous radioac-
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tive source detection method was then proposed based on SNR. Results showed that the proposed algorithm
could correctly estimate the background radiation distribution and reach over 90% accuracy for radioactive
source detection when source was close to detectors (e.g., less than 5 meters away) or source intensity was
high enough (e.g., 300 µCi or above).
Poisson kriging was helpful for identifying suspicious regions that might contain radioactive sources.
Based on the results from Poisson kriging, two source localization techniques, KDE with MLE and grid
search with MLE, were proposed to estimate the locations of radioactive sources. Simulation studies and
experiments with simulated radioactive source injected compared the performance of the proposed algorithms
and showed that grid search with MLE gave robust estimation and could reduce the source localization error
to be within 3 meters.
Lastly, this work conducted an exploratory study on spectrum-based anomaly detection for radiation
data. Various methods, including methods based on dimensionality reduction, methods based on regression
analysis, and methods based on proximity, were studied in detail. The performance of different methods was
compared using simulated data. Methods such as the KNN method or the autoencoder method, performed
well for anomaly detection, but they had limitations on prediction complexity or training complexity. Meth-
ods such as the PCA model might not give the best performance, but they were easy to implement or make
prediction. Trade-off between model complexity and model performance need to be considered for actual
implementation.
Overall, this work presented the workflow behind nuclear radiation detection and demonstrated the
feasibility of mobile sensor networks for nuclear radiation detection. Through simulations and experiments,
the performance and limitation of the proposed approaches were quantified. These results and analyses
would provide good reference for the actual deployment of mobile sensor networks and future related work.
8.2 Future Work
As a challenging problem, nuclear radiation detection consists of many different aspects. This work only
covers parts of this complex problem. Influence of other factors such as radiation temporal variation, mobile
radioactive sources, and shielding effect have not been explicitly studied. For future work, there are several
potential research directions:
Implementing and testing the proposed algorithms in real-world environments. The algo-
rithms proposed in this work have been tested through simulations and experiments. However, there are
certain simplifications for the simulation, and the experiment was conducted only in a small region without
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actual radioactive sources. To obtain realistic assessment of the proposed algorithms, these algorithms need
to be implemented and tested in real-world environments.
Combining information from different detectors. This work assumes that all data are collected
using the same types of detectors. This assumption simplifies the calculation of Poisson kriging and MLE.
However, in real cases, information from different types of detectors may need to be combined. For example,
there exists different types of detectors, which may have different resolution, efficiency, and channel numbers.
In this case, developing efficient algorithms that can combine information from different detectors might be
necessary.
Combining stationary and mobile sensor networks. Although this work focuses on mobile sensor
networks, stationary radiation detectors are also very important. Mobility brings certain advantages for
nuclear radiation detection, but it also brings restrictions such as detector size. Stationary detectors, on
the other hand, can be placed at choke points with more sensitive detectors. In this case, it is necessary to
develop algorithms that can combine information from stationary and mobile detectors for nuclear radiation
detection.
Hardware development. As shown in this work, the number of detectors is a key factor that de-
termines the performance of mobile sensor networks. More detectors can help increase the probability of
radioactive sources being detected and increase the source localization accuracy. However, the cost restricts
the deployment of more detectors. Development of cheaper radiation detectors with similar performance
makes it possible to deploy more detectors and achieve better performance.
Information fusion for object tracking. This work only studies the application of radiation detectors
for radiation detection and monitoring. In real cases, the information from other sources, for example,
surveillance cameras, can also be utilized. For example, through combining radiation detection techniques
and computer vision techniques such as convolutional neural networks, the movement of vehicles that carry





In this work, simulations are conducted based on two types of detectors, the Ortec 905-3 NaI detector
and the D3S detector.




PMT. The dimension of the 905-3 detector is shown in Fig. A.1.
Figure A.1: Dimensions of NaI 905-3 detector.
More detailed information about the Ortec 905-3 detector can be found at http://www.ortec-online.
com/-/media/ametekortec/brochures/905.pdf.
Another detector, the Discreet Dual Detector, or D3S, is a hybrid gamma/neutron detector used for
national security applications from Kromek Group plc. The detailed technical information is shown in
Table A.1.
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Table A.1: Characteristics of D3S Detector
Item Specifications
Gamma detector CsI(Tl) detector
Resolution 7% resolution at 662 keV
Gamma energy range 30 keV to 3 MeV
Gamma sensitivity 500 cps/µSv/h (5 cps/µR/h) for Cs137
Maximum throughput for gamma channel 10, 000 cps
Dose rate Up to 15 µSv/h at 662 keV (1.5 mR/h)
Neutron detector Sensitivity 12 cps/nv
Neutron detector gamma rejection Better than 10−7
Maximum throughput for neutron channel 10, 000 cps
Communications Micro USB Bluetooth@
Operational battery life 12 hours
Operational temperature range −20 to 50◦C
Size 132 mm × 80 mm × 23.5 mm (5.2′′ × 3.1′′ × 0.9′′)
Humidity Up to 93% RH
Moisture/Dust IP53
Weight 237 g (0.52 lbs)
Battery 1450 mAh Lithium polymer
Charging Inductive charging Charging via USB




Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software, or GADRAS, is a spectrum simulation and analysis
software developed and maintained by Sandia National Laboratories. For radiation spectrum simulation,
GADRAS applies a detector response function to compute the output from corresponding detectors [77,102].
Current response function applies a combination of first-principles calculations and empirical models, which
makes the simulated spectrum more accurate for a broad range of detectors. For background radiation
simulation, it provides templates based on locations, such as the templates from Chicago and Salt Lake City.
For isotope identification, GADRAS uses a template-based approach for making identifications [76,79].
A snapshot of the GADRAS screen is shown in Fig. B.1. The left part of the figure is GADRAS user
interface. Users can specify a series of simulation settings, such as the distance to source, detector height,
simulation time, background radiation setting and so on. The right part of the figure shows a simulated
spectrum of a 10 µCi 137Cs radioactive source for 1 hour.
Figure B.1: Snapshot of GADRAS software.
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Appendix C
Synthetic Data Simulation Process
The synthetic data simulation includes two parts: background radiation simulation and radioactive source
simulation.
For background radiation simulation, to incorporate the spatial variation, high background radiation and
low background radiation are needed. In GADRAS, the background radiation simulation can be specified
using cities. Since Chicago has relatively low background radiation compared with Salt Lake City, the
radiation data simulated in Chicago are used to represent low background radiation, and the radiation data
simulated in Salt Lake City are used to represent high background radiation. In both cases, detectors are
assumed 1 meter above the ground and spatial location (Chicago or Salt Lake City) is the only changing
parameter. Based on these settings, for D3S detector, the average background radiation count rate for
Chicago is 31 cps while the average background radiation for Salt Lake City is 38 cps.
For radiation from radioactive sources, spatial location of radioactive source is no longer the changing
parameter. Instead, radioactive isotopes, source strength, distance from the source, and shielding effect are
the most influencing factors. In this work, since all data are assumed to be collected in outdoor environment
and simulated sources are not strong, the shielding effect except the shielding from air is ignored. During
the simulation, radioactive sources are assumed to be placed on the ground and detectors are located 1
meter above the ground. Simulations are conducted for different isotopes, such as 137Cs, 60Co, and 54Mn,
and different source strength, such as 100µCi, 300µCi, 500µCi, 1, 000µCi, and 2, 000µCi. For the given
isotope and source strength, the simulation is conducted for different distances. The schematic diagram of
the simulation process is shown in Fig. C.1. The simulated radioactive source is placed at the center of
circles. For each distance from 0.5 m until 20 m, the simulation is conducted for every 0.5 m. At each





Figure C.1: Schematic diagram of radioactive source spectrum simulation process. The spectra are simulated
at different distances from the radioactive source.
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Appendix D
Instructions on How to Use the
Synthetic Data
D.1 Synthetic Data Simulation
In this work, the spectra from background radiation and different isotopes are simulated using GADRAS
as described in section 3.2.2. The background radiation and the radiation from radioactive sources are
separated.
The following code demonstrates how to load the simulated background radiation data. The loaded data
are saved in Numpy array format such that each row corresponds to one single spectrum.
1 import numpy as np
2
3 # load s imulated background spec t ra
4 background = np . load ( ’ . / D3 background . npy ’ )
Listing D.1: Demo of reading simulated background radiation spectra
For the radiation from radioactive sources, the distance from the source need to be considered. In the
following code, the loaded data are in Python dictionary format. The key is the distance from the radioactive
source, and the corresponding value is Numpy array which contains multiple simulated spectra.
1 import p i c k l e
2
3 # load s imulated r a d i o a c t i v e source spec t ra
4 with open ( ’ . / D3 source . p ’ , ’ rb ’ ) as f :
5 source = p i c k l e . load ( f )
Listing D.2: Demo of reading simulated radioactive source spectra
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D.2 Mobile Sensor Network Simulation
For the mobile sensor network simulation system, users can specify the region of the simulation, source
position, number of detectors, and the speed of the detectors. In the following code, the region are assumed
to contain 36 (6× 6) 100m× 80m city blocks as shown in Fig. 3.4. There are 100 mobile detectors and the
simulation lasts for 3,600 seconds (1 hour).
1 from r o a d w a l k s i m u l a t o r s h i e l d i n g import road wa lk s imu la to r
2
3 # d e f i n e source l o c a t i o n s
4 source = [ ( 1 0 5 , 85) , (105 , 265) , (105 , 445) , (215 , 175) , (215 , 355) ]
5
6 # bui ld s imu la to r
7 s imu la to r = road wa lk s imu la to r ( area =(6 , 6) ,
8 s o u r c e l o c=source ,
9 detector num =100 ,
10 speed low =1.4 ,
11 speed h igh =1.8 ,
12 n channel =512 ,
13 per iod =3600 ,
14 h igh back rad iu s =400 ,
15 hasSource=False ,
16 s h i e l d i n g=False )
17 # run s imu la t i on
18 s imu la to r . s imulate ( )
19
20 # save data to l o c a l f o l d e r
21 s imu la to r . save data ( ’ . / s imu la t i on . csv ’ , spectrum=True )
Listing D.3: Demo of mobile sensor network simulation
The above code saves the simulation results as a CSV file. The CSV file contains the information about
detector id, timestamps, detector localizations, distance to the nearest detector, count rate information, and
the whole spectrum. Figure D.1 shows a snapshot of the CSV file generated from the simulation.
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In this work, the simulation is conducted in a region segmented into a 6 × 6 grid of 36 blocks as shown
in Fig. E.1. Section 3.3 gave a brief description of the simulation. This chapter gives more details about the
simulation, especially for the cases corresponding to Chapter 4.
Figure E.1: Illustration of simulated radioactive source locations.
Consider the case shown in Fig. E.1, 13 radioactive source are placed at the intersections of roads1,
denoted by red circles. These sources cover different cases, and they are far away from each other such that
for any detector in this region, the measured radiation data is influenced by at most one radioactive source.
1The exact locations of radioactive sources have little influence on the conclusion.
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GADRAS simulated data as described in section 3.2.2 contain two parts: background radiation data and
radioactive source data. For background radiation data, the data simulated based on Chicago is used to
model low background radiation region and the data simulated based on Salt Lake City is used to model
high background radiation region. For radioactive source data, at each distance from 0.5 m to 20 m, there
are 1,000 or 3,000 spectra simulated for sampling purpose. Appendix C and Appendix D have more details
about the simulated data.
After the simulation starts, multiple radiation detectors are moving in the simulated area. When there
are no radioactive sources or the detector is far away from the radioactive sources, the count rate from
radioactive source is set to be 0. The background radiation count rate is sampled from the simulated
background radiation database. In this work, since the lower left region is set to be high background
region, when the detector moves into the high background radiation region, the background radiation data
is sampled from the data simulated based on Salt Lake City, and when the detector moves into the low
background radiation region, the background radiation data is sampled from the data simulated based on
Chicago. When there are radioactive sources, such as the cases in Fig. E.1, the background radiation data
is still sampled as described above. For source data, at first, the distances of the detector to all radioactive
sources are calculated. If the smallest distance is larger than 20 m, the detector are not influenced by the
radioactive source and the source count rate is set to be 0. When the smallest distance is smaller than 20
m, the source data is sampled from the simulated radioactive source data according to the smallest distance




In this work, the experiment with a small mobile sensor network system was conducted on the engineering
campus of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The experiment was conducted in an outdoor
region of approximately 500 × 400 m2 in area. During the experiment, operators placed the D3S detectors
in their pockets and walked at the normal walking speed (around 1.4 m/s) along the designed paths. The
experimental region and walking paths are shown in Fig. F.1. There are several regions that have relatively
higher background radiation. These locations are all near buildings. Three typical high background radiation
locations are denoted by dashed rectangles, including Nuclear Radiation Laboratory (A), the Alma Mater














Figure F.1: Illustration of experimental area, background radiation measurements, radioactive source loca-
tions, and source injection process.
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After collecting background radiation data, the synthetic radioactive sources are injected into the collected
data. The radiation data collected in the morning are used to model the background radiation distribution
and the radiation data collected in the afternoon are used to inject simulated radioactive sources. Ten se-
lected locations for injecting radioactive sources are marked using red numbers from 1 to 10. After synthetic
source injections, the measurements that are close to the injected radioactive sources are influenced by the
source and their radiation count rates are increased. The amplitude of the increase is determined by the
source intensity, shielding, and distance between radiation detector and sources. The recorded data con-
tain the detector’s id, latitude, longitude, UNIX time, gross counts, and the corresponding spectrum. The
collected background radiation data and the simulated data can be accessed through Illinois Data Bank at
the following address: https://doi.org/10.13012/B2IDB-9119873_V1. A snapshot of the collected data
is shown in Fig. F.2.
Figure F.2: Snapshot of collected experimental data.
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Appendix G
Possion Kriging Error Case Analysis
As shown in Fig. 5.11, the proposed algorithm cannot correctly locate the radioactive source under certain
conditions. One of the major reasons is that there exist some difference between the data (background radi-
ation data collected in the morning) used to estimate background radiation levels and the data (background
radiation data collected in the afternoon) used to inject radioactive sources. Considering the measured data
around the statue, some statistical characteristics are shown in Table G.1 for the background radiation data
collected in the morning and the data collected in the afternoon. Clearly, radiation data collected in the
afternoon have larger mean compared with the data collected in the morning. This is one of the reason
leading to the results shown in Fig. 5.11.
Table G.1: Statistical Distribution of Radiation Data from Morning and Afternoon
Measurement (cps) Min 25% 50% 75% Max Mean Standard Deviation
Morning 20.00 37.00 48.00 57.00 83.00 48.37 13.17
Afternoon 26.00 45.50 53.00 62.00 73.00 53.10 12.01
To better support this analysis, the same source injection procedure is repeated using the background
radiation data collected in the morning, instead of using the data collected in the afternoon. The proposed
SNR-based anomaly score is calculated as described in Chapter 5, and the results are shown in Fig. G.1.
Compared with Fig. 5.11, using the data collected in the morning for source injection, the proposed algorithm











Figure G.1: A case where source injection is conducted on the data collected in the morning. The injected
source is denoted by the red cross and the estimated source location is denoted by the black triangle.
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Appendix H
Proof that Profile Log-Likelihood
Function is Concave
Here, following the procedure shown in Reference [68], the proof is rewritten in the notations used in this
work.




[mi · log(b0 + si)− (b0 + si)− log(mi!)] , (H.1)
where s0 is the source intensity, b0 is the background radiation level, si is the average source intensity at the
position of i-th detector, and mi is the radiation count rate measurement from i-th detector.
For above equation, a radioactive source with source intensity s0 is assumed to be placed at location
r0, the i-th detector is placed at position ri, and their distance is di = ||ri − r0||. The first-order and the
second-order partial derivatives of the profile log-likelihood function are give below.



































































































By Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, it can be shown that:













The log-likelihood function is shown in Eq. I.1.
`(θ) = `(s0, r0, b0) =
N∑
i=1















To maximize the profile log-likelihood function `r0(θ), gradient ascent method or Newton-Raphson
method can be used.
I.1 Gradient Ascent Method
The iterative scheme for gradient ascent method is:






where k is the number of calculation iterations, η is learning rate, and ∇θ(k) is the gradient.

















In Eq. I.3, background radiation level bi is assumed to be known. When bi is unknown and the study





















































The iterative scheme for the Newton-Raphson algorithm is:

















 is the vector to be estimated, `r0(θ(k)) is the profile log-likelihood function, ∇θ(k) is the
gradient, and ∆θ(k) is the Hessian matrix [68].
Given some initial guess θ(0), the MLE of θ can be iteratively found by using Eq. I.5. More precisely,




















































































During practical implementation, it is found that with appropriate initialization, for example, setting s0
to be 0 and b0 to be 38 cps for D3S detectors, Newton-Raphson algorithm converges within 50 iterations,
while gradient ascent method need more than 1,000 iterations to converge if the learning rate is set to be
0.01. Thus, in this work, the Newton-Raphson algorithm is implemented for optimization.
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Appendix J
Preliminary Analysis for Mobile
Radioactive Sources
Chapter 6 describes the application of KDE with MLE and grid search with MLE for cases in which
radioactive sources are stationary. When the radioactive sources are stationary, since there will be continuous
measurements around the radioactive sources, the calculation can be continued as new data are collected,
which leads to relatively accurate results. However, in other cases, radioactive sources might be carried by
people or vehicles, which makes the source localization task much more difficult. Compared with stationary
radioactive sources, for mobile radioactive sources, one of the most important difference is that there is no
guarantee that the continuous measurements from the region surrounding the radioactive sources will be
available, especially when there are limited number of detectors. It is possible that all the detectors at some
point of time are far away from the radioactive sources, which makes the radioactive sources statistically
impossible to be detected based on the measurements at that time.
For a mobile source, since the radioactive source keeps moving, the approach which uses all the available
measurements around the source does not work. Instead, a small time window can be selected and the
measurements within that time window should be used for calculation. The smallest time window is 1, in
which case only the measurements at the moment are used to locate the radioactive sources. When the
chosen time window is larger than 1, some previous measurements will also be used. Theoretically, if the
time window size is too small, the number of measurements used for the calculation will also be small, which
restricts the performance of the proposed algorithm. On the other hand, if the time window size is too large,
the mobile source might have moved a large distance during the chosen period, which will also restrict the
performance of the mobile sensor network.
To study the performance of proposed algorithms for mobile sources, simulations are conducted with
multiple mobile detectors and single mobile source in the study area in each simulation. The experimental
setting is the same as described in section 3.3. 50 detectors move along the street with constant speed for
each detector. The radioactive source is also moving along the road. Its speed is fixed at 1.4 m/s. Similar
to mobile detectors, radioactive source have the same probability to move along the original direction, turn
left, or turn right at the intersections. And when it reaches the boundary, it turns back and the simulation
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continues. The source intensities are chosen to be 100 µCi, 300 µCi, 500 µCi, 1,000 µCi, and 2,000 µCi.
The box plots1 of the source localization error for 500 µCi sources are shown in Fig. J.1. The horizontal axis
corresponds to the number of detectors, vertical axis corresponds to source localization errors, and different
time windows (1 through 10) are denoted using different colors. Number of detectors in the simulation are:
40, 60, 80, · · · , 160.
Figure J.1: Box plot for source localization errors with 500 µCi source. Time window varying from 1 second
to 10 seconds is denoted using different colors. Number of detectors are varied from 40 to 160.
In Fig. J.1, the time window size varies from 1 second to 10 seconds, and the source localization error
varies as a function of number of detectors and the time window size. When the time window is only 1 second,
the source localization error is very large. Error drops dramatically from time window of 2 seconds, but then
remains fairly uniform (and in fact, increasing slightly in some cases with larger time windows). Considering
the distribution of the source localization error and for the conditions studied here, time windows of 3, 4, or
5 seconds seem to be optimal choices.
Impact of detector quality and source intensity on source localization error is shown in Fig. J.2. Setting
the time window to be 4 seconds, the source localization error with 60 detectors are shown in Fig J.2 for
1Box plot is a method to visualize the distribution of numerical data through quartiles. In the middle, the median is shown
using a horizontal line. And the box shows area between 25% percentile (Q1) and 75% percentile (Q3). The IQR is defined as
the interquartile range between 25% percentile and 75% percentile. The lowest horizontal line shows the value corresponding
to Q1 - 1.5 × IQR and the highest horizontal line shows the value corresponding to Q3 + 1.5 × IQR. All the measurements
that is beyond this range are defined as outlier, and are shown using dots.
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different source intensities. Results for D3S detector and Ortec-905 detector are denoted using different
colors. Not surprisingly, with strong radioactive sources, the median source localization error decreases,
especially for D3S detectors. For Ortec 905 detectors, this improvement is small since for 100 µCi radioactive
source, the source localization error is already small. Using better detector, for example, Ortec versus D3S,
also improves the source localization results, especially for the cases with weak radioactive sources. For
example, for 100 µCi radioactive source, the median source localization error is around 7 meters for Ortec
905 detectors, while it is around 10 meters for D3S detectors. But in all these cases, the performance of
mobile sensor networks is much worse compared with stationary radioactive sources.
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Figure J.2: Box plot for source localization errors with 60 detectors.
As discussed in this section, when radioactive sources are moving, accurately detecting or locating the
radioactive sources becomes much more difficult. When there is only limited number of detectors, the
probability that a detector can reach close to the mobile sources is small. Even after appropriate time
window is selected, the performance of the mobile sensor network is still much worse compared with stationary
radioactive sources. Further studies are needed to address this problem.
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Appendix K
Connection between Grid Search with
Maximum Likelihood Estimation and
Bayesian Estimation
The source localization problem from the perspective of parameter estimation is discussed in Chapter 6.
Parameter estimation is essentially a process of maximizing the likelihood function. KDE with MLE and
grid search with MLE are two approaches to solve or approximately solve the maximization problem. This
is a process that is purely based on the collected measurements. However, in real cases, different kinds of
prior information can also be included to optimize the source localization process.
From the perspective of hypothesis testing [8], for each position r0 in the study area, the null hypothesis
H0 and alternative hypothesis Ha are:
H0: There is no radioactive source at position r0.
Ha: There is radioactive source with certain strength at position r0.
Given the measurementsm1,m2, · · · ,mN used for calculation, the goal is to calculate P (H0|m1,m2, · · · ,mN )
and P (Ha|m1,m2, · · · ,mN ) such that the ratio can be used to measure the likelihood that there are radioac-
tive sources at position r0. In other words, the position with highest value of
P (Ha|m1,m2,··· ,mN )
P (H0|m1,m2,··· ,mN ) is assumed
to be the most likely source location.
Based on Bayes rule, the ratio can be derived as:
P (Ha|m1,m2, · · · ,mN )
P (H0|m1,m2, · · · ,mN )
=
P (Ha) · P (m1,m2, · · · ,mN |Ha)




· P (m1,m2, · · · ,mN |Ha)
P (m1,m2, · · · ,mN |H0)
. (K.1)
Since P (m1,m2, · · · ,mN |H0) can be seen as constant given m1,m2, · · · ,mN , and P (m1,m2, · · · ,mN |Ha)
is the same as discussed in Section 6.2.1, if the effect of prior information P (Ha)P (H0) is ignored, this method is
equivalent to the grid search with MLE approach discussed previously. However, the prior information can
be used to improve the search algorithms.
Considering P (Ha), that there is radioactive source with certain strength at position r0, P (Ha) is likely
to be higher at crowded places and lower at other areas. Through incorporating the prior information P (Ha)P (H0) ,
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the distribution of P (Ha|m1,m2,··· ,mN )P (H0|m1,m2,··· ,mN ) could be different from the case in which prior information is ignored.
In this way, when there may exist multiple potential radioactive sources, although all the potential regions
should be examined, with limited amount of resources, the posterior ratio distribution provides the priority
of searching and will help reasonably allocate the resources.
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Appendix L
Sample Code for Autoencoder
Implemented in TensorFlow
1 import random
2 import p i c k l e
3 import numpy as np
4 import t en so r f l ow as t f
5 import keras
6 from keras . models import Sequent ia l , Model
7 from keras . l a y e r s import Dense , Dropout , F lat ten
8 from keras . l a y e r s import Conv1D , MaxPooling1D
9
10 de f autoencoder ( l a y e r s =(512 , 256 , 128 , 256 , 512) , name=’ Autoencoder ’ ) :
11 ””” d e f i n e f u l l y −connected Autoencoder s t r u c t u r e ”””
12 model = Sequent i a l (name=name)
13 model . add ( Dense ( input shape=( l a y e r s [ 0 ] , ) , un i t s=l a y e r s [ 1 ] , a c t i v a t i o n=’ r e l u ’ , name=’
dense−1 ’ ) )
14 f o r i in range (2 , l en ( l a y e r s ) ) :
15 i f i == len ( l a y e r s ) − 1 :
16 model . add ( Dense ( un i t s=l a y e r s [ i ] , a c t i v a t i o n=’ r e l u ’ , name=’ output ’ ) )
17 e l s e :
18 model . add ( Dense ( un i t s=l a y e r s [ i ] , a c t i v a t i o n=’ r e l u ’ , name=’ dense− ’ + s t r ( i ) ) )
19
20 r e turn model
21
22
23 # To reproduce the r e s u l t , r e f e r to https : // keras . i o / get t ing−s t a r t e d / faq /
24 seed = 42
25 np . random . seed ( seed )
26 random . seed ( seed )
27 s e s s i o n c o n f = t f . Conf igProto ( i n t r a o p p a r a l l e l i s m t h r e a d s =1, i n t e r o p p a r a l l e l i s m t h r e a d s
=1)
28 t f . set random seed ( seed )
29 s e s s = t f . S e s s i on ( graph=t f . g e t d e f a u l t g r a p h ( ) , c o n f i g=s e s s i o n c o n f )
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30 K. s e t s e s s i o n ( s e s s )
31
32 # Def ine autoencoder
33 l a y e r s =(1024 , 512 , 256 , 512 , 1024)
34 model = autoencoder ( l a y e r s=laye r s , name=’ Autoencoder ’ )
35
36 # In the f o l l o w i n g code , assume the t r a i n i n g data , v a l i d a t i o n data are denoted by tra in ,
va l
37 # Create opt imize r
38 opt = keras . op t im i z e r s .Adam( )
39 model . compi le ( opt imize r=opt , l o s s=’ mean abso lu te e r ro r ’ )
40
41 # Create c a l l backs
42 checkpo int = ModelCheckpoint ( f i l e p a t h=’ . / model/MAE autoencoder− ’ + s t r ( l a y e r s ) + ’−ckpt . h5 ’
, verbose =0, monitor=’ v a l l o s s ’ , s a v e b e s t o n l y=True )
43
44 # Fit the model
45 h i s t o r y = model . f i t ( x=tra in , y=tra in , b a t c h s i z e =512 , epochs =500 , verbose =0, c a l l b a c k s =[
checkpo int ] , v a l i d a t i o n d a t a =(val , va l ) )
46
47 # Save model and h i s t o r y
48 p i c k l e . dump( h i s t o r y . h i s to ry , open ( ’ . / model/MAE autoencoder− ’ + s t r ( l a y e r s ) + ’−h i s t o r y . p ’ ,
’wb ’ ) )
Listing L.1: Demo of Autoencoder Implementation
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Appendix M
K-Nearest Neighbors Query Time
Analysis
As discussed in section 7.4, proximity-based method are usually called “lazy” method. There is generally
no procedure to fit or train a model first and make predictions later. Instead, for each unknown measurement,
the proximity-based model needs to calculate the distance to all measurements in the dataset. For the dataset
with N instances and D dimensions, in the the naive implementation, the query time grows as O(N · D),
which is very expensive for cases with large N or D.
To speed up the computation for proximity-based methods, K-D Tree [103] and Ball Tree [104] can be
implemented. To compare the influence of different data structures on KNN method, 62,500 spectra are
used as the training dataset and the query time is calculated for different number of nearest neighbors k.
The result is shown in Fig. M.1.
























Figure M.1: Comparison of query time for KNN with different number of neighbors.
From Fig. M.1, the number of nearest neighbors to query has little influence on the total query time,
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but the data structure has dramatic influence on the query time. K-D Tree and Ball Tree can dramatically
speed up the query process.
In addition to data structure, another influencing factor is the sample size of the training set. Figure M.2
shows the query time for different sample size N . For all three cases, the average query time increases
roughly linearly as the sample size increases. But using K-D Tree and Ball Tree can help reduce the query
time, especially for large amount of training data.

























Figure M.2: Comparison of query time for KNN with different sample size.
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Appendix N
Application of Anomaly Detection
As discussed in Chapter 1, anomaly detection, source localization, and isotope identification are three
major problems involved in nuclear radiation detection. These three parts are interconnected. For example,
source localization is usually based on the results of anomaly detection. Through anomaly detection, the
search regions are restricted to relatively smaller areas, which can reduce the computational resources needed
and reduce the false positive rates.
Anomaly detection, especially the spectrum-based anomaly detection, is also important for isotope iden-
tification. Through anomaly detection, the spectra that contain no information about radioactive sources
are removed, which not only reduces the computational resources, but also eliminates the influence of noisy
data. In addition, reconstruction-based anomaly detection techniques, for example, PCA or autoencoder,
can make isotope identification task easier.
Considering three isotopes, 60Co, 137Cs, and 54Mn, using PCA, the dimension of the spectra can be
reduced from 512 to 2, and three different spectra can be visualized in two dimensions as shown in Fig. N.1.
Figure N.1: Visualization of sample 60Co, 137Cs, and 54Mn spectra PCA projection. Data are simulated
using GADRAS as described in Chapter 7.
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As shown in Fig. N.1, the spectra of 137Cs and 54Mn are quite similar to each other. When source
intensities are not strong, background radiation spectra also blur the boundary between different isotopes.
To make it easier for different isotopes being separated with each other, PCA and autoencoder described
in section 7.2 can be applied to estimate background radiation spectra through reconstructing the original
radiation spectra. After estimating the background spectra, the difference between original spectra and
reconstructed spectra are assumed to mainly contain the information from isotopes instead of background
radiation. Through PCA, the difference spectra can be visualized again using the projection on the first two
principal component directions. The results are shown in Fig. N.2.
(a) Projection after PCA. (b) Projection after Autoencoder.
Figure N.2: Visualization of sample 60Co, 137Cs, and 54Mn spectra PCA projection after dimensionality
reduction and reconstruction.
As shown clearly, after dimensionality reduction and reconstruction using PCA and autoencoder, the
three isotopes are better separated compared with the raw spectra in Fig. N.1. The isotope identification
methods, for example, the methods proposed by Kamuda et al. [35], can be directly applied to the difference
spectra instead of the original radiation spectra.
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